critical rationalism blog

It is high time now, I think, to formulate the epistemological results of this discussion. I will put them in the form of nine theses.

1. There are no ultimate sources of knowledge. Every source, every suggestion, is welcome; and every source, every suggestion, is open to critical examination. Except in history, we usually examine the facts themselves rather than the sources of our information.

2. The proper epistemological question is not one about sources; rather, we ask whether the assertion made is true — that is to say, whether it agrees with the facts. (That we may operate, without getting involved in antinomies, with the idea of objective truth in the sense of correspondence to the facts, has been shown by the work of Alfred Tarski.) And we try to find this out, as well as we can, by examining or testing the assertion itself; either in a direct way, or by examining or testing its consequences.

3. In connection with this examination, all kinds of arguments may be relevant. A typical procedure is to examine whether our theories are consistent with our observations. But we may also examine, for example, whether our historical sources are mutually and internally consistent.

4. Quantitatively and qualitatively by far the most important source of our knowledge — apart from inborn knowledge — is tradition. Most things we know we have learned by example, by being told, by reading books, by learning how to criticize, how to take and to accept criticism, how to respect truth.

5. The fact that most of the sources of our knowledge are traditional condemns anti-traditionalism as futile. But this fact must not be held to support a traditionalist attitude: every bit of our traditional knowledge (and even our inborn knowledge) is open to critical examination and may be overthrown. Nevertheless, without tradition, knowledge would be impossible.

6. Knowledge cannot start from nothing — from a tabula rasa — nor yet from observation. The advance of knowledge consists, mainly, in the modification of earlier knowledge. Although we may sometimes, for example in archaeology, advance through a chance observation, the significance of the discovery will usually depend upon its power to modify our earlier theories.

7. Pessimistic and optimistic epistemologies are about equally mistaken. The pessimistic cave story of Plato is the true one, and not his optimistic story of anamnesis (even though we should admit that all men, like all other animals, and even all plants, possess inborn knowledge). But although the world of appearances is indeed a world of mere shadows on the walls of our cave, we all constantly reach out beyond it; and although, as Democritus said, the truth is hidden in the deep, we can probe into the deep. There is no criterion of truth at our disposal, and this fact supports pessimism. But we do possess criteria which, if we are lucky , may allow us to recognize error and falsity. Clarity and distinctness are not criteria of truth, but such things as obscurity or confusion may indicate error. Similarly coherence cannot establish truth, but incoherence and inconsistency do establish falsehood. And, when they are recognized, our own errors provide the dim red lights which help us in groping our way out of the darkness of our cave.

8. Neither observation nor reason are authorities. Intellectual intuition and imagination are most important, but they are not reliable: they may show us things very clearly, and yet they may mislead us. They are indispensable as the main sources of our theories; but most of our theories are false anyway. The most important function of observation and reasoning, and even of intuition and imagination, is to help us in the critical examination of those bold conjectures which are the means by which we probe into the unknown.

9. Every solution of a problem raises new unsolved problems; the more so the deeper the original problem and the bolder its solution. The more we learn about the world, and the deeper our learning, the more conscious, specific, and articulate will be our knowledge of what we do not know, our knowledge of our ignorance. For this, indeed, is the main source of our ignorance — the fact that our knowledge can be only finite, while our ignorance must necessarily be infinite.

From "From Sources of Knowledge and Ignorance", Conjectures and Refutations, section xiv

I consider this to be one of Popper’s more important essays, which is why I provide some rough study notes here. I highly recommend people read this essay. It is contained in Conjectures and Refutations, pages 162 to 182.

1. Popper asks: what problem would a theory of tradition solve? How would we go about constructing it?

2. Popper cites Edmund Burke as having launched the best defense of traditions in his criticism of the French Revolution. While Popper thinks highly of Edmund Burke, he criticizes him for ultimately taking an irrationalist stance. Popper states, “The anti-rationalists in the field of politics, social theory, and so on, usually suggest that this problem cannot be tackled by any kind of rational theory. Their attitude is to accept tradition as something just given. You have to take it; you cannot rationalize it; it plays an important role in society, and you can only understand its significance and accept it.”

3. There is hostility between rationalists and irrationalists: “Rationalists are inclined to adopt the attitude: ‘I am not interested in tradition. I want to judge everything on its own merits; I want to find out its merits and demerits, and I want to do this quite independently of any tradition. I want to judge it with my own brain, and not with the brains of other people who lived long ago.‘”

4. Ironically, the rationalists attitude that he must judge things on their own merit is, in itself, a tradition of sorts. So some rationalists seem to beg the question. That is, they follow a rule: you should judge everything on your own. Following that rule constitutes a certain tradition. Why should that tradition be any better than any other? This is very similar to the problem of justification.

5. Neither the irrationalists or the rationalists have adequately dealt with the problem of tradition.

6. “Certain types of tradition of great importance are local, and cannot easily be transplanted.” Popper discusses the scientific tradition. It was started in Greece, but destroyed and did not start again for quite some time. While now in some countries the scientific tradition is pursued in others it has still not taken root.

7. Popper seems to complain about both the scientific tradition in New Zealand and the classical music tradition in America. He cites these as an example of how difficult it is to transplant a tradition. This essay is from a lecture Popper delivered in 1949, by the way.

8. Popper states there are two main attitudes we can have towards tradition.

8a. We can passively and unconsciously accept it.

8b. We can be critical of it, either accepting it or rejecting it, or perhaps making   some kind of compromise in regards to it.

9. However, even if you accept the critical attitude, you can’t criticize nothing. Popper states, “we have to know of and to understand a tradition before we can criticize it, before we can say: ‘We reject this tradition on rational grounds.’ Now I do not think that we could ever free ourselves entirely from the bonds of tradition. The so-called freeing is really only a change from one tradition to another. But we can free ourselves from the taboos of a tradition; and we can do that not only by rejecting it, but also by critically accepting it. We free ourselves from the taboo if we think about it, and if we ask ourselves whether we should accept it or reject it. In order to do that we have first to have the tradition clearly before us, and we have to understand in a general way what may be the function and significance of a tradition.”

10. Popper discusses the scientific tradition as it is one he is familiar with. He discusses two problems he finds with the scientific tradition:
10a. “A part of the rationalist tradition is, for example, the meta-physical idea of determinism. People who do not agree with determinism are usually viewed with suspicion by rationalists who are afraid that if we accept indeterminism, we may be committed to accepting the doctrine of Free Will, and may thus become involved in theological arguments about the Soul and Divine Grace. I usually avoid talking about free will, because I am not clear enough about what it means, and I even suspect that our intuition of a free will may mislead us. Nevertheless, I think that determinism is a theory which is untenable on many grounds, and that we have no reason whatever to accept it. Indeed, I think that it is important for us to get rid of the determinist element in the rationalist tradition. It is not only untenable, but it creates endless trouble for us. It is, for this reason, important to realize that indeterminism–that is, the denial of determinism–does not necessarily involve us in any doctrine about our ‘will’ or about ‘responsibility’.”

10b. “Another element in the rationalist tradition which we should question is the idea of observationalism–the idea that we know about the world because we look around, open our eyes and ears, and take down what we see, hear, and so on; and that this is what constitutes the material of our knowledge. This is an extremely deep-rooted prejudice and is, I think, an idea which impedes the understanding of scientific method.”

11. Popper now states that a theory of tradition would have to be a kind of sociological theory. Therefore, Popper first proposes to discuss the task of theoretical social sciences.

12. Popper first discounts what he calls a mistaken theory which he attributes to many rationalists. He calls this the “conspiracy theory of society”.

13. Early Greeks attributed the vagaries of social life to the gods. Modern man, often shirking off theism of any kind, attempted to do the same thing, only instead of attributing things to various gods, they blame powerful men or groups.

14. Popper states that conspiracies are bound to fail because of unexpected outcomes: “… one of the striking things about social life that nothing ever comes off exactly as intended. Things always turn out a little bit differently. We hardly ever produce in social life precisely the effect that we wish to produce, and we usually get things that we do not want into the bargain. Of course, we act with certain aims in mind; but apart from the question of these aims (which we may or may not really achieve) there are always certain unwanted consequences of our actions; and usually these unwanted consequences cannot be eliminated.”

14a. It’s important to note here that this idea is very similar to Edmund Burke’s views concerning tradition. Edmund Burke in his Reflections on the Revolution in France states:

“The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or reforming it, is, like every other experimental science, not to be taught *a priori*. Nor is it a short experience that can instruct us in that practical science; because the real effects of moral causes are not always immediate, but that which in the first instance is prejudicial may be excellent in its remoter operation, and its excellence may arise even from the ill effects it produces in the beginning. The reverse also happens; and very plausible schemes, with very pleasing commencements, have often shameful and lamentable conclusions. In states there are often some obscure and almost latent causes, things which appear at first view of little moment, on which a very great part of its prosperity or adversity may most essentially depend. The science of government being, therefore, so practical in itself, and intended for such practical purposes, a matter which requires experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole life, however sagacious and observing he may be, it is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes.” While there seems to be at least some controversy regarding Burke’s views, and Popper, himself, calls Burke an irrationalist, in my initial reading of _Reflections on the Revolution in France_ I saw many similarities with Popper’s approach and what Burke discusses there. I think comparison between Popper and Burke is something that deserves more time than I have at present.

14b. Another important thinker who also talks a great deal about unintended consequences is F.A. Hayek. It is a running theme in most of his works. A particularly good essay where this issue is addressed is in his essay “The Errors of Constructionism”. While those with an interest are urged to check out this essay, which is in Hayek’s, New Studies, a very small selection should help give an idea regarding Hayek’s position:
“The proper conclusion from the considerations I have advanced is by no means that we may confidently accept all the old and traditional value. Nor even that there are *any* values or moral principles, which science may not occasionally question. The social scientist who endeavours to understand how society functions, and to discover where it can be improved, must claim the right critically to examine, and even to judge, every *single* value of our society. The consequences of what I have said is merely that we can never at once and the same time question *all* its values. Such absolute doubt could lead only to the destruction of our civilisation and – in view of the numbers to which economic progress has allowed the human race to grow – to extreme misery and starvation. Complete abandonment of all traditional values is, of course, impossible; it would make man incapable of acting.”

15. Popper states that the purpose of social science is to study unintended consequences: “The characteristic problems of the social sciences arise only out of our wish to know the unintended consequences, and more especially the unwanted consequences which may arise if we do certain things.”

16. People who approach history with a conspiracy theory are missing the real point of social sciences. Popper states, “It is the task of social theory to explain how the unintended consequences of our intentions and actions arise, and what kind of consequences arise if people do this that or the other in a certain social situation.”

17. Here Popper discusses the issue of conscious design. Conspiracy theories generally assume there is someone who is planning everything, such that someone is aware of all that is going on. Collective groups are viewed almost as individuals (For example, the Jews, or the Japanese, or the Religious Right, or the liberal media, or whatever). However, given that no one can know all the consequences of their actions, such total control is simply not possible.

18. It’s rare that people actually intentionally create a tradition. Traditions are often created unintentionally. Given this, how are we to study the origin of traditions?

19. Another, more important problem, is the role of traditions in social life. Is it possible to provide a rational explanation for various traditions and social institutions?

20. In order to look at this issue, Popper proposes to look at scientific traditions as a kind of model case.

21. Popper wants to draw a parallel between how we hold theories about the world, and how we hold various traditions.

22. Popper asks where did the rational tradition start. Some people assert it started when the Greeks first attempted to explain nature, and it was a result of trying to explain nature that gave rise to the tradition. Popper rejects this. (Note this also helps understand why Popper rejects determinism. Some people assume science is merely about adopting a determinist attitude, then attempting to describe the world from their observations. For them, that is science. Popper is rejecting this viewpoint.)

23. While it’s true that Greek philosophers did indeed try to understand nature, so did many of those who proceeded them. So we can not assign the rational tradition to the attempt to explain nature.

24. Popper asserts that what changed with the early Greek philosophers was there willingness to question old explanations and try to improve them. They didn’t just accept old tradition but were willing to challenge it, invent new alternatives, and debate more than one explanation. (Thus science can be associated less with explanation and more with the critical attitude.)

25. Popper distinguishes a first order tradition, that of passing down explanations of the world in the form of myths, and a second order tradition which consists of critical discussions in regards to these myths.

26. Popper believes that this second order tradition was entirely new, and it is what gave rise to the scientific tradition.

27. At this point observation took on new meaning. Observation was used to test some myths against others. In arguing about which myth best explain observations, observation became a way to test one myth against another.

28. Thus, observation is not something we *just* do. It is something we do to test our myths, our theories about the world. The Greeks were the first to realize this.

29. Popper notes: “From this point of view the growth of the theories of science should not be considered as the result of the collection, or accumulation, of observations; on the contrary, the observations and their accumulation should be considered as the result of the growth of the scientific theories. (This is what I have called the ‘searchlight theory of science’–the view that science itself throws new light on things; that it not only solves problems, but that, in doing so, it creates many more; and that it not only profits from observations, but leads to new ones.) If in this way we look out for new observations with the intention of probing into the truth of our myths, we need not be astonished if we find that myths handled in this rough manner change their character, and that in time they become what one might call more realistic or that they agree better with observable facts. In other words, under the pressure of criticism the myths are forced to adapt themselves to the task of giving us an adequate and a more detailed picture of the world in which we live. This explains why scientific myths, under the pressure of criticism, become so different from religious myths. I think, however, we should be quite clear that in their origin they remain myths or inventions, just like the others. They are not what some rationalists–the adherents of the sense-observation theory-believe: they are not digests of observations. Let me repeat this important point. Scientific theories are not just the results of observation. They are, in the main, the products of myth-making and of tests. Tests proceed partly by way of observation, and observation is thus very important; but its function is not that of producing theories. It plays its role in rejecting, eliminating, and criticizing theories; and it challenges us to produce new myths, new theories which may stand up to these observational tests. Only if we understand this can we understand the importance of tradition for science.”

30. It’s impossible to observe without some theory to guide us. Moreover, random observations are not any where near as important to us as observations made with the intent to test a theory.

31. Popper next discusses the importance of the problem situation. “All this means that a young scientist who hopes to make discoveries is badly advised if his teacher tells him, ‘Go round and observe,’ and that he is well advised if his teacher tells him: ‘Try to learn what people are discussing nowadays in science. Find out where difficulties arise, and take an interest in disagreements. These are the questions which you should take up.’ In other words, you should study the problem situation of the day. This means that you pick up, and try to continue, a line of inquiry which has the whole background of the earlier development of science behind it; you fall in with the tradition of science. It is a very simple and a decisive point, but nevertheless one that is often not sufficiently realized by rationalists–that we cannot start afresh; that we must make use of what people before us have done in science. If we start afresh, then, when we die, we shall be about as far as Adam and. Eve were when they died (or, if you prefer, as far as Neanderthal man). In science we want to make progress, and this means that we must stand on the shoulders of our predecessors. We must carry on a certain tradition. From the point of view of what we want as scientists–understanding, prediction, analysis, and so on–the world in which we live is extremely complex. I should be tempted to say that it is infinitely complex, if the phrase had any meaning. We do not know where or how to start our analysis of this world. There is no wisdom to tell us. Even the scientific tradition does not tell us. It only tells us where and how other people started and where they got to. It tells us that people have already constructed in this world a kind of theoretical framework–not perhaps a very good one, but one which works more or less; it serves us as a kind of network, as a system of co-ordinates to which we can refer the various complexities of this world. We use it by checking it over, and by criticizing it. In this way we make progress.”

32. Popper summarizes his thinking this way: “It is necessary for us to see that of the two main ways in which we may explain the growth of science, one is rather unimportant and the other is important. The first explains science by the accumulation of knowledge: it is like a growing library (or a museum). As more and more books accumulate, so more and more knowledge accumulates. The other explains it by criticism: it grows by a more revolutionary method than accumulation–by a method which destroys, changes, and alters the whole thing, including its most important instrument, the language in which our myths and theories are formulated.”

33. So what we have here is the case of tradition being vital, as it shows us the road we have thus far traveled. However, we also have it being vital that we question and exam tradition itself. So, like the rationalists, Popper thinks we should question things. Yet, like the traditionalists he thinks we must respect and guard our traditions.

34. After having giving science as an example, Popper goes on to discuss the problem of a sociological theory of tradition.

35. Popper cites J.A.C. Brown who stated that if “if there is no discipline in a factory, then ‘the workers become anxious and terrified’.” Popper agrees that the unknown, that is the unpredictable is one of humans’ great fears. Kind of makes me think of H.P. Lovecraft who once said, “the oldest and strongest emotion of mankind is fear, and the oldest and strongest kind of fear is fear of the unknown.”

36. Popper disagrees that the answer to fear is merely discipline. Instead, Popper points out the traditions and institutions help us to make sense of our world. He states, “What we call social life can exist only if we can know, and can have confidence, that there are things and events which must be so and cannot be otherwise.”

37. Popper argues, “The mere existence of these regularities is perhaps more important than their peculiar merits or demerits. They are needed as regularities, and therefore handed on as traditions, whether or not they are in other respects rational or necessary or good or beautiful or what you will. There is a need for tradition in social life.”

38. Popper’s main point is that without some form of order, rational action would be impossible. Even language itself would not be possible. Popper states, “It is not possible for you to act rationally in the world if you have no idea how it will respond to your actions.” We simply have no way of knowing how people will respond to us, unless we are all following at least some of the same rules.

39. Popper argues that no world is perfect, but at least the one we have now has developed a complex tradition that has a history behind it. The idea that we could wipe clean all our traditions and start fresh is misguided. The new society would be an impoverished one. He states, “Similarly traditions have the important double function of not only creating a certain order or something like a social structure, but also giving us something upon which we can operate; something that we can criticize and change. This point is decisive for us, as rationalists and as social reformers. Too many social reformers have an idea that they would like to clean the canvas, as Plato called it, of the social world, wiping off everything and starting from scratch with a brand new rational world. This idea is nonsense and impossible to realize. If you construct a rational world afresh there is no reason to believe that it will be a happy world. There is no reason to believe that a blue-printed world will be any better than the world in which we live. Why should it be any better? An engineer does not create a motor-engine just from the blue-prints. He develops it from earlier models; he changes it; he alters it over and over again. If we wipe out the social world in which we live, wipe out its traditions and create a new world on the basis of blue-prints, then we shall very soon have to alter the new world, making little changes and adjustments. But if we are to make these little changes and adjustments, which will be needed in any case, why not start them here and now in the social world we have?”

40. Popper argues if we were to sweep away the entire social order, then what would their be to inform us that the new planned order was any good. “Moreover the idea of canvas-cleaning (which is part of the wrong rationalist tradition) is impossible, because if the rationalist cleans the social canvas and wipes out the tradition he necessarily sweeps away with it himself and all his ideas and all his blueprints of the future. The blue-prints have no meaning in an empty social world, in a social vacuum. They have no meaning except in a setting of traditions and institutions–such as myths, poetry, and values–which all emerge from the social world in which we live. Outside it they have no meaning at all. Therefore the very incentive and the very desire to build a new world must disappear once we have destroyed the traditions of the old world.”

41. Popper does a little summarizing, explaining how he can understand both the traditionalists and the rationalists. They both seem to have it right, at least as much as they have it wrong. Both of them seem to be neglecting the importance of the other. We need a tradition as it gives us a framework within which to work on our problems, however, if we stick rigidly to that framework we can’t make progress. So we need our traditions, and we need to criticize them.

42. Popper compares and contrasts the roles of traditions and institutions. He feels that institutions develop very much like traditions.

43. Popper finishes up with a discussion of language and how it relates to both institutions and traditions.

A few links of interest:

Rafe Champion’s review of F. A. Hayek’s “The Fatal Conceit”

Kelly Ross’s essay: “Conservatism, History, and Progress”

Greg Nyquist’s “True Conservatism, False Conservatism”

CRist (critical rationalist) – A person who does NOT hold a theory of rationality.

TRist (traditional rationalist) – A person who does hold a theory of rationality.

A CRist needs to distinguish between the truth and falsity in every case, at least when such a case comes up for questioning.

A TRist need only apply his theory of rationality to whatever assertion is in question. As such, he need never distinguish between truth and falsity. His theory does that for him.

In this way, CRists have a need to distinguish between truth and falsity, TRists do not.

I saw a question posed in the the CR (critical rationalism) forum recently which asked, how could a person have no need to distinguish between the truth and falsity of an assertion, such that they didn’t have a theory of rationality?

This seemed to suggest that TRists recognize that there is a need to distinguish between truth and falsity, while CRists don’t.

Yet it would seem to be just the opposite. As TRists have a theory of rationality to distinguish truth from falsity for them, they need not do it themselves. As CRists have no such theory of rationality, they must distinguish between truth and falsity themselves.

In other words, if such a theory of rationality existed and really worked, the truth would take care of itself. We would never have to decide anything. What CR is asserting is that we always *must* decide, such that there can’t really be a method, or meta-method, at least not in any *positive* sense.

An example might be induction. Theories of rationality using induction are a bit like this: First, we look at particular cases. When we note a pattern that is repeating itself, after a certain number of repetitions of a *particular* our theory of rationality tells us to classify it as a universal. After many observations of “a swan is white” I classify “all swans are white.” as true. (There are various arguments for asserting such a method, or meta-method. In my opinion all face some serious flaws.)

Certain Christians perhaps assert that their method for deciding truth is to listen to God, divine inspiration, or to trust the word of God as presented in the bible. Some scientists say we should use induction, some Christians divine inspiration or the Bible, Buddhists perhaps emphasize meditation … hopefully you get the picture. Rather than rely on human judgment, actual judgment is placed upon some theory of rationality. (I’ll note here that I don’t think CR is *necessarily* incompatible with religion. But I’ll save that for a separate discussion.)

CR suggest, as I understand it, that there simply is no *positive* method whereby we can obtain the truth. Not only this, CR suggests that attemping to hold to such a *positive* method might narrow our viewpoint such that the quest for truth is made more difficult. In an attempt to get our decision about the truth to fit with some narrow view of what the method of truth *should* be, we will be restricting ourselves in a way that is unnecessary. After all, there is no one method that is the end-all-be-all of obtaining truth.

Ultimately determining truth is something inexplicable that humans do. There’s no way to figure out how they do this, such that it can be condensed into a sure fire algorithm. There’s no way to create an algorithm that would determine truth. See:

http://www.geocities.com/criticalrationalist/popperindividual.htm

However, CR does accept that people can make progress towards the truth. This is taken as a working assumption. (It’s open to criticism.)

While CR does not support any *positive* method, a *negative* method is sort of suggested. We can approach the truth primarily by trying to understand new ideas, letting these new ideas come into conflict with previously held ideas, and thereby making adjustments which bring us closer to the truth. Note, I take the term new ideas fairly broadly such that it could conceivably even be taken as a new observation. For example, I find a black swan. I now hold that there is at least one black swan. That’s a new idea for me. New ideas if rejected, of course, don’t really come into conflict with older ideas. There’s no rule that says we *must* take on board any new idea. What we must do is look for new ideas, or think them up, and then take them under consideration.

As we take on new ideas, we bring them into conflict with the old ones. The sorting process leaves us closer to the truth. The more we can do to facilitate this process the better we can do at getting nearer to the truth.

One way to facilitate this process is to argue against *positive* methods for obtaining the truth, which overly restrict our viewpoints.

An important thing to note is that TR (traditional rationalism) leads to irrationalism. Imagine you have a theory of rationality.

How did you decide about this theory? As this is your meta-theory, it can not judge itself in terms of rationality. Any *positive* argument in regards to rationality cannot judge itself without creating a circular argument.

For example:

A: Why are you rational?

B: Because I listen to God.

A: How do you know that listening to God is rational.

B: Because God told me.

That’s circular.

As such, you *must* say the choice was merely irrational and that all such first choices are irrational. But, this is like saying we chose such theories without any reference to their consequences then hold to them come what may. As if to say, we can be rational but only after first making an irrational commitment. I don’t think that is the case. In fact, rather than an appeal to rationality, it is an appeal to irrationality. That is, by asserting there is a theory of rationality, this leads you to the next move, which why is the theory of rationality, in and of itself, rational? Here you can only assert it was an irrational choice and all such first choices are by necessity irrational. As such you open the door to whole scale irrationality. If you allow one choice, then why not many. CR avoids having to make this capitulation to irrationality by NOT offering any *positive* theory of rationality.

Another question, why should all other theories be subservient to one particular theory of rationality? When crossing the street do you actually apply a theory of rationality? “Hm, I see some cars coming. Is that a rational thought? Let’s see, what does my theory of rationality say about this?” Nobody does this. The only reason people use theories of rationality is when they want to assert moral superiority. That’s the only purpose they serve. Some people want to say their opinion is better than someone else’s opinion. In order to show it is better, they resort to a theory of rationality.

The only possible benefit you can possibly receive from having a *positive* theory of rationality is it can give you a sense of moral superiority when dealing with others. That is, if you think your theory of rationality is correct, you could be *sure* you were right and whoever disagrees with you is wrong. Or at least you could argue that way. However, your opponent could merely point out your theory of rationality itself was also irrational. At this point the argument ends. You both take your irrational stand and the only way to resolve the conflict is to engage in violence.

CR, however, merely asserts that we recognize that when we try to bring our current views into conflict with new views, we get nearer to the truth. If there is a conflict of opinions, this is good. One of us might be closer to the truth and by working to understand the other, there is the possibility of a breakthrough. (However, if the other has a theory of rationality this will be a big hindrance. Rather than try to work to explain their view and find relevant criticism of your view, they will merely assert they are right. They are right because their theory of rationality says so. Theories of rationality have a tendency to turn off the discussion.)

People with theories of rationality take stands, CRists keep arguing. They keep trying to shift through the ideas to try and figure-out where the disagreement lays and what might resolve it. This is an endless process. It might not be resolved until some new ideas come along. But even then, this will probably only lead to new disagreements. All the better.

CR could almost be viewed as the complete absence of holding of any traditional theory of rationality.

People who hold close to some theory of rationality at this point usually ask weird questions, like, “what if a man believes the moon is made of green cheese?” or “why should I accept that cold blooded murder is wrong?”

They feel as if without some theory of rationality they will be lost without rudder at sea. However, it is perfectly acceptable NOT to believe the moon is made of green cheese, even if you don’t have a theory of rationality. It is perfectly acceptable to hold that cold blooded murder is wrong even without a theory of rationality. It’s as if people who want a theory of rationality think they need permission to think this way or that. They don’t.

In this sense, I tend to think CR shows far more trust in humanity than traditional theories of rationality do.

[These notes were written on November 8, 2004. I hope I have a chance to revise them in the future. People really interested in this issue should read W. W. Bartley’s: Limits of Criticism (doc). ]

There are some people who insist that the truth of values must be demonstrated in someway. Here I have a created a dialog between one such person and a critical rationalist.

Can you guess which is which?

A: Demonstrate the truth of your value statement.
B: Why?
A: In order for values to be held they must be demonstrated true, or why else hold them?
B: So, you hold that “Values must be demonstrated true.”
A: Yes.
B: But, “values must be demonstrated true” is a value. Can you demonstrate why it is true?
A: No.
B: But you hold it to be true?
A: Yes.
B: So you have values that you can’t demonstrate to be true.
A: Yes. Well, no. That is, I believe demonstration of truth is possible, I just haven’t figured out the fine details yet.
B: Well, I have many values I hold to be true. Fortunately I don’t require demonstration of them. I merely try to put them in an objective form (that is to express them as clearly as possible) so that if someone has criticism or alternatives we can discuss them. Don’t you think this is superior to trying to demonstrate the truth of some value once and for all?
A: No, that’s all wrong. If you can’t demonstrate the truth of your values, then they are completely worthless. We could all do just whatever we want.
B: Can you demonstrate the truth of what you just said?
A: What do you mean?
B: Well, you seem to think that we will all do whatever we want, but what does it mean to say, “whatever we want”? Moreover, can you demonstrate the truth of “we will all do whatever we want if we can’t demonstrate the truth of our values”?
A: Well, as to your first question, I just mean people could behave immorally and they would be on par with moral people, after all no one could demonstrate the truth of their statements, so it would be merely a matter of arbitrary decision. That is to say, there would be no distinction between moral and immoral.
B: Do you think your own decisions are arbitrary, then?
A: Well, no, I think truth must be demonstrable, I just haven’t got it straight in my head how to do it, at least not as far as values. I’m sure, however, that *my* morals are the correct ones, so it’s only a matter of time before I can find a way to demonstrate them true.
B: Well, I for one don’t think values can be demonstrated as true. Is not that hypocritical? *If* you accept that humans have values, then it’s *their* values. They are not dependent on demonstration, otherwise, why would we consider them *our* values?
A: Aren’t you just making some kind of circular argument here or perhaps arguing from definition?
B: No. What I am saying is that the two ideas are logically incompatible. “Truth is demonstrable” logically entails that “truth is not determined by humans”. If you hold that “humans decide about the truth” then you can’t hold that “truth is demonstrable.” These are mutually contradictory ways of viewing the world. To make it clearer we could instead say, “truth is determined by human judgment” or “truth is determined unequivocally by demonstration.” Not only are these two ideas incompatible, as truth is a value we as humans place on certain ideas or viewpoints, it makes no sense to say it can be determined by demonstration. It is determined by humans.
A: What rubbish. You’re simply confusing words here. If the truth is determined by humans, then all we need do is present how it was determined. What was the basis or criteria or standard that was used to determine the truth?
B: It certainly might be helpful to discuss how we made a particular value judgement. We might discuss certain consequences of holding or not holding the value. However as it is a value, it is determined by human judgement, not any particular demonstration. So there can be no basis or criteria or standard. Otherwise that would be to remove the human element from this. Truth is determined by humans, not criteria or standards or bases. Moreover, a criteria cannot be its own criteria. Again, it is an issue of responsibility. Even assuming you have a criteria you think is adequate, how did you determine that? Are you responsible for that judgement, or is the criteria responsible? Merely claiming a standard or a criteria or a basis does not help one to demonstrate the truth of values. Instead, it creates a certain amount of hypocrisy. If we claim a basis gives us truth, we then are making the implicit claim that truth requires bases. But then it is plainly obvious our own basis lacks a basis, as it cannot be its own basis. By claiming truth must be demonstrated by bases we undermine our own moral integrity. A similar case might be made for the Christian who says that miracles support his faith in God. Is that not hypocritical? After all, faith is faith. It does not require proof. Similarly, from a Christian perspective, if a person is “good” because he wants to go to heaven, is he not being “bad” as he is pursuing selfish ends. While I think that one can be willing to question “humans have values”, and therefore hold the position non-dogmatically, I don’t think that the notion that “humans have values” is logically compatible with “values are determined by demonstrations.”
A: But some demonstrations are undeniable.
B: Hardly. I know of no demonstration that is undeniable. Moreover that misses my point. Truth is a value. It is not the content of the assertion or idea. Therefore it is separate from the assertion or idea.
A: Well, I must disagree somewhat here. Some truths are undeniable. What we seek is a way to find truths that are undeniable.
B: You mean some kind of positive methodology.
A: If you want to call it that, fine.
B: Well, positive methodologies have about as much humanity as a software program. Positive methodologies are automatic. They tell people exactly how they must judge the truth, so that they need *not* judge the truth.
A: Who cares if it gets you the truth?
B: Well, in fact, I’ve never known a positive methodology that actually works. What I have known are several people who are dogmatic and dictatorial because they think they have a positive methodology. Moreover, as I pointed out before, the positive methodology can’t demonstrate it’s own truth. It’s own standards can’t justify it’s own standards. So those with positive methodologies either have to resort to circular arguments or hypocrisy or both.
A: Assuming I agreed, what’s your suggestion.
B: Speaking in metaphysical terms, I guess you could say I believe in the rational unity of man, reason is the same for all of is. Although the burden of truth falls on each of our shoulders individually, we are all united in the sense we share the same world. Truth is the same for all of us. There is only one truth. We’re each approaching it from different directions and positions and situations. Comparing, contrasting and criticizing these positions helps all of us to weed out error and get nearer to the truth. At least those of us who have an interest in the truth. I believe that we must work to share our ideas and take part in critical discussions and that this is how we progress. I propose a negative methodology. We learn by imaginatively thinking up new idea, new values, new approaches, new positions, then once they are mature enough, subjecting them to criticism. As this is a negative methodology, it need not resort to circular arguments of justification and is therefore not hypocritical. Nor does it attempt the impossible task of taking the burden of judging the truth off our individual shoulders.
A: What do you mean by negative methodology?
B: I mean that we only shift ideas when criticism is brought to bear on them and better alternatives are presented. No idea is ever proved or justified.
A: But unless the criticism is *justified*, that is has a basis, it’s worthless. Therefore, you can’t get out of this merely by proposing a negative methodology. That’s plain silly.
B: No, it’s clear we favor some ideas over others without any appeal to bases. Clearly critical discussions cause shifts in our ideas, even without the presence of any bases.
A: But, what use is a critical discussion if there is no way to demonstrate the truth for sure of any statement. Literally any statement is as good as another.
B: But that doesn’t seem to be the case. Clearly to both you and me, some statements, or let’s say ideas or positions, are more valuable than others. If you believe in the truth, and I scarcely see how you could get by without it, then the question is *NOT* how to demonstrate it, but how to approach it. Clearly we learn. And clearly the way we do so is by replacing bad ideas with better ones. So what we need to do is look at what rules facilitate this. Our philosophy is thus concerned with these rules.
A: Rules like what?
B: Well, there are numerous examples I could give. One would be freedom of speech. People should be able to express their opinion so long as it doesn’t cause undue harm to someone. Another good example would be people should express themselves clearly, so that their opinion is easier to criticize. Another example might be a preference for keeping written documents of discussion as these can more easily be discussed. Perhaps institutions should be in place to protect new ideas in their infancy so they have a chance to mature. I imagine each one of these rules could be debated and perhaps improved, but merely to give you an idea of what I am talking about.
A: That’s all well and fine, but what is your basis for these?
B: If you mean by basis some way to prove them true or some criteria by which I can automatically judge them to be true, then in ultimate terms there simply is nothing like that. These are rules we’ve learned by trial and error that help us on our journey towards approaching the truth. Our approach is to work to find rules that aid us to find the truth, but not to propose criteria or standards. The only criteria or standards is human judgment. And we’ve got to recognize that while we can approach the truth, no one possess it. We are fallible.
A: But “approach the truth” requires a standard of some sort. How else would you know you had the truth? Why replace a bad idea with a good one *unless* you have some kind of standard? What is your standard? Clearly one is implied by everything you say.
B: But I’m not clear on why you think a standard is required to change an idea. In fact, I thought we’d just resolved this. Clearly we both value some ideas over others, even without any basis. We also both believe in the concept of truth. How exactly a human being arrives at judgments of the truth is an interesting question, but, as far as I know, it appears unanswerable. Why? Because every statement about how we judge the truth in any ultimate sense, would have to logically entail itself. But if it logically entailed itself, it could not judge itself.
A: But even if it couldn’t judge itself it could still be right, couldn’t it?
B: It would remove the need for truth and the value for truth altogether. I can’t fathom that as a logical possibility. We would say as we now know how human beings judge truth, in physical or psychological terms, we can now judge the truth without any human present. If a criteria is undeniable, human judgement may as well be automated. We can program a computer to do it. You know, there are so many possible criticism of this viewpoint it’s hard to know where to begin. For one, it would mean that truth was no longer a value, but a kind of fact. As such there would be no value of truth, as such there would be no truth. However, if there was no truth, then how did we determine how humans judged the truth in the first place?
A: But aren’t you just talking in circles?
B: No, what I am saying is that we have to accept that judgments of truth can only rest on human shoulders and can not ever be factually explained.
A: But any good scientist knows the world is determined. Determinism is a fundamental tenet of science! Are you against science, then? Are you one of those?
B: Why do you think that? I’m not at all sure every scientist would agree with you, by the way.
A: I knew it all along, you want to undermine science.
B: No, I admit that scientists search for regularities.
A: Yes, so there is the implicit assumption that the world is made up of regularities. In other words, scientists assume a deterministic universe. It’s implicit in what they do.
B: Hardly, scientists merely acknowledge that there are some regularities and propose to search for them. This doesn’t necessarily have to characterize their metaphysical conception of the world. Not at all.
A: How could it not!
B: Well, first of all, we can respect the rule, “search for regularities” without assuming that all the universe is nothing but regularities. Moreover, the world could in some sense be indetermined, an open universe in which we have a bit of say as to how it will turn out. These are metaphysical posits that can be argued for or against, and have nothing to do with the scientists’ rule, “search for regularities.” As an side some of my arguments for indeterminism might be like this: In a deterministic universe there would be no place for time, yet we experience time. In a deterministic universe there would be no change, yet change seems to be a fundamental part of our existence. Personally, I’d guess the only thing that is really determined is the logical content of our assertions. We sort of view the world through the deterministic glasses or our logic. Though, perhaps when we judge the truth we do so in way that is indetermined. Anyway, just some passing thoughts.
A: Look, cut out all the metaphysical nonsense, and let’s get back to reality. Ultimately, your assertions don’t amount to diddly squat unless you have some kind of basis to back them up, all right? Aside from some fanciful rhetoric, I don’t see how you’ve offered me anything here.
B: But again, your assertion is false by its own standards. Your own assertion can’t demonstrate itself true.
A: But this just comes back to doing whatever we want. Why not just believe anything?
B: Why don’t you try it for a day and see what happens? My guess is you won’t get far. We do judge the truth. Even without a scientific or factual explanation concerning why or how. Look, you make decisions about the truth everyday. Just like you decide something tastes good, or something is beautiful or something is interesting, you decide if something is truthful. It’s a value decision. What you really want is a way to reduce values to facts. You want to say, “we decide truth because of this undeniable criteria and no other decision is acceptable but this one. We now have an undeniable standard concerning the truth. You are no longer free to determine the truth, but must follow this standard as it is undeniable.” However, if there is no freedom to determine the truth for ourselves, then it is merely a done deal of sorts. An automatic process. It’s like having a trial by jury, but then telling each jurist exactly how he must decide. Or worse, it’s like having 12 personal computers for jury members instead of individual human beings. If there is an undeniable way to demonstrate the truth, then human valuing doesn’t even have a place in the process anymore. This is absurd. What can one make out of a total denial of the value we place on the truth? Do you or do you not value truth? If you value the truth, then how can you square that with a process that determines what we must value as true in advance so that we need no longer value it?
A: You’re not making sense. This most be some kind of deconstructive smoke and mirrors game.
B: Do you value truth?
A: Of course, I do. I value truth. But why should that mean that how men decide truth can’t be reduced to a demonstration.
B: I’m not saying demonstrations or what have you don’t have any role to play, I’m merely asserting that they don’t create a basis. We must each judge the truth for ourselves, and we do so fallibly.
A: That’s NOT enough! What if I decide to take a gun and go shoot someone, or what if I join the Islamic Jihad?
B: Why would you do those things?
A: Because I can, because you haven’t demonstrated the truth to me!
B: Well, while I can’t demonstrate the truth to you, I can certainly inform you that the consequences for those actions would be untold human suffering. Is that not sufficient?
A: In lieu of being able to demonstrate the truth that many people will suffer, why should I believe you?
B: Well, because it’s the truth. If necessary I am willing to discuss these ideas by considering alternative viewpoints. Do you really not understand the consequences of the actions you’ve proposed here?
A: But how do you know even those consequences are true?
B: Can you give me a reason to think otherwise?
A: Yes, in order for truth to be truth it must be demonstrable or it’s not truth. Damn it!
B: But that’s simply not the case. As most trial lawyers have learned, opinions that supposedly have proof can be false, and opinions without proof are often true. Ultimately, as these are issues of human value, it makes sense that when matters such as this are decided in court we use a jury of our peers as opposed to a person who has mastered how to demonstrate the truth. Again, if truth were demonstrable, a court would merely need some expert in the truth, not a jury.
A: To hell with you. You make no sense. You’ve convinced me of one thing here, it’s all a lot of crap. I’m just going to to do whatever I want, and you know what, it’s YOUR fault. Because while at least in the past, while I couldn’t demonstrate truth, I at least had faith that truth was demonstrable. Now I don’t even believe that. I’m just going to believe whatever I want from now on. Get the hell out of my way. [Gives B a good shove and walks away.]
B: Perhaps he thinks I’m a post-modernist. (sigh) Maybe I should have quoted Edmund Burke?