Force and Charity

Rafe champion writes:

Welfare is a sticking point for many people of good will who support freedom but believe that they cannot be libertarians because of all the poor people who need assistance. Actually support for deserving poor people could be provided by a VWA (Voluntary Welfare Association), dispensing funds from voluntary donations from all the people who currently vote to support welfare policies. Serious socialists would set the example by donating all surplus wealth and income above the national average. I have run this idea past some socialists but they are not enthused because they think that the rich would be too mean to contribute. This view is amply refuted by the evidence of charitable donation, especially the way that donations increase when taxes are lowered.

I would guess Rafe is correct about real life rich people refuting this view by making donations (but I think it deserves a cite. There are well known examples like Bill Gates, but those may not be representative of the average rich man’s behavior.)

One could make objections to this argument, such as: “Without tax incentives, the rich will change their charitable giving behaviors.” Or, “Rich people today may be decent, but what if one day they start becoming scrooges? And wouldn’t the market make that happen because people who don’t give to charity will, on average, become richer than those who do?”

I don’t think those are very compelling objections, but I do think there’s an opportunity here to bring up a deeper argument.

Objecting to the possibility of a rich man choosing not to donate to charity is saying: he should do [the thing I think is best], and if he won’t do it then he should be forced. It’s advocating the violent seizure of the money from rich people who refuse to give away enough money.

So far this is a standard libertarian argument to which some people reply, “Who cares? When a poor man goes hungry, or can’t buy medicine he needs, that’s a really big deal too. Why should we prioritize an anti-social rich man, who will still have a very nice lifestyle because he has plenty of money to spare, over the poor man who needs the money to avoid basic suffering and to have some reasonable opportunities in life? Forceful seizure of excess money is one of the milder forms of suffering in the world, so why are you so dead set on protecting the people who don’t need your help from mild suffering at the expense of people who are suffering far more?”

This reply assumes that the reason that force is bad is that it causes suffering in the victims. That is certainly a reason that force is bad, however it’s not the primary one.

The fundamental reason that using force is bad is that force is an irrational way of approaching disagreements. This position is largely due to one of the best liberal writers, William Godwin.

Godwin saw that when people disagree about the use of some money, that is a disagreement. In a disagreement, it’s always irrational to assume one party is correct and the other is mistaken based on irrelevant characteristics such as the race, religion, or richness of one party. Instead, ideas must be judged on their merits. The view that taking the rich man’s money is beneficial assumes one party (the taker) is correct in his evaluation, and the other party (the rich man) is mistaken. And it assumes this without providing any argument.

When a man refuses to give money to one cause, he always keeps it for some other cause. The money doesn’t just go to waste, it goes to something else. People use their money for whatever purposes they consider best. The socialist disagrees about what is the best use of the money. And he reacts to this disagreement not by offering arguments that his position is correct, but instead by using violence. This violence doesn’t just cause some suffering, it also sabotages any rational debate that might discover the truth of how the money should be used. Forcing one use of the money, while destroying efforts to discover the correct use of the money, is an approach with no regard for truth or learning, and consequently must often make mistakes and never correct them, and that’s why it’s bad.

If the socialist had a compelling argument, surely he would use it. If he could persuade the rich man that the charitable cause he advocates is best, then he would do so. He would explain the merits of his proposed use of money; he would point out all the good it will do. It’s cheaper, easier, safer and nicer to persuade the rich man than force him. Who wouldn’t want a voluntary ally, if he could have one? People only use force when their arguments fail. They only use force when they cannot adequately explain the merits of their position. They pretend to use force because they know the truth, but actually they use force because their arguments are weak.

That last paragraph is an adaptation of William Godwin’s argument: “If he who employs coercion against me could mold me to his purposes by argument, no doubt he would. He pretends to punish me because his argument is strong; but he really punishes me because his argument is weak.”

Some might object, “The socialist’s proposed use of money is best overall, but not best for the rich man. There is a conflict of interest.” To claim that people fundamentally have conflicts of interest that cannot be resolved with reasoned discussion is a large and pessimistic claim. I won’t get in to it here except to say: if there are inevitable, unresolvable conflicts of interest, shouldn’t we aim for a system where conflicts of interest never lead to violence? It seems to me that it’s very important to make sure these conflicts reliably don’t become fights if they are bound to occur with regularity.

In conclusion, when the issue is seen in terms of a disagreement which must be approached rationally, and for which there is one truth of the matter, which is possible to find, then the liberal, tolerant approach to charitable giving is the only rational, truth-seeking approach.

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SA in criminology

An excellent paper by Paul Knepper applies Popperian Situational Analysis to criminology. The paper appeared in the Review of Austrian Economics.

He provides an introduction to Popper’s ideas about social sciences and the methodology of situational analysis (SA) plus the rationality principle (RP). He described how Popper turned to the social sciences after 1935 and he speculated about the way that Menger’s ideas and others from the Austrian school of economics and social thought impacted on his thinking.
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Anthony O’Hear on Popper

Prof O’Hear now at the University of Buckingham wrote the Popper entry in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy edited by Ted Honderich. O’Hear has been writing about Popper for along time, his first major book Karl Popper was published in 1980. It was a very bad book. He argued that Popper could not get away from some kind of inductive principle, along the lines that the future will be like the past (if we claim to learn anything from the rsults of an experiment).  This was answered crisply on the friesian site.

“These all can be called “inductive assumptions,” but they owe nothing to induction. Quite the opposite. With them, however, O’Hear’s objection here to Popper disappears. Thus, when O’Hear says, “…we would need something like an inductive jump, from past to future” [p. 40], there actually is no reason not to postulate the validity of that jump: It is just a higher order rule, with the same logical status, as all the other contents of scientific theories.” Continue reading

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Hans-Hermann Hoppe getting Popper wrong

Hans-Hermann Hoppe is a leading figure in the group of Austrian economists who are based at the Mises Institute in the US. At one stage of his life he was influenced by Popper but he moved on and his major influences became Ludwig von Mises and Murray Rothbard, who he follows by adopting the very strong and dogmatic form of apriorism which claims to deduce the whole of economic theory from one basic Axiom of human action.

Being a man of strong views, it is interesting to read some of his interpretations of Popper. These are taken from a paper ‘In defence of extreme rationalism: Thoughts on Donald McCloskey’s The Rhetoric of Economics’.

Hoppe is at war with positivism and empiricism which is ok except that he puts Popper in the same boat because Popper does not accept that there are  “a priori” truths about the world that can be known to be true without investigation. Hoppe does not accept that Popper’s critical rationalism is any advance on crude empiricism or logical positivism.

Note18. Karl R. Popper, in order to distinguish his falsificationism from the verificationism of the early Vienna Circle, prefers to label his philosophy “critical rationalism.” To do so, however, is highly misleading if not deceptive, much like the common U.S. practice of calling socialists or social democrats “liberals.” For in fact, Popper is in complete agreement with the fundamental assumptions of empiricism (see the following discussion in the text) and explicitly rejects the traditional claims of rationalism, i.e. of being able to provide us with a priori true empirical knowledge in general and an objectively founded ethic in particular….

In fact, it is only fair to say that it is Popper who contributed more than anyone else to persuading the scientific community of the modernistic, empiricist-positivist worldview. In particular, it should be emphasized that it was Popper who is responsible for Hayek’s and Robbins’ increasing deviations from their originally much more Misesian methodological position. Continue reading

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Explanation versus justification

Many people conflate explanation and justification. An explanation is a theory about why something happened or why we should do one thing rather than another. A justification is a story about why we are right, or probably right, to adopt one theory rather than another or one proposal for action rather than another. Explanations are good; justifications are at best a waste of time.

Explanations are good because they provide a target for criticism. If I say why I’m doing something somebody might come up with an argument against it that will change my mind. If I take an action for which I have some explanation and it all goes horribly wrong then I may be able to criticise my actions more easily if I can explain them. An explanation can also be looked upon as an encouragement to criticise an action or idea. An explicit statement of why it seems like a good idea invites people to pick apart the list of arguments I’ve given for my preference.

Justification does not encourage criticism. A justification supposedly shows that its conclusions are correct or probably correct, which means presumably that we probably shouldn’t bother criticising them. Justification also encourages people to waste time with endless fiddly details of a particular idea or course of action when often a cold hard critical look at the theory without the details will make it seem unpromising. I will give an example. I recently witnessed a philosophy discussion in which the participants were discussing knowledge by discussing the meaning of the phrase ‘to know.’ The participants were tying themselves in knots talking about justification and so on until somebody said that maybe there was something wrong with the way people usually think about knowledge and perhaps they should change their theories. The leader of the discussion then replied by saying, ‘Ah, but then we wouldn’t be discussing the meaning of the phrase “to know” in English.’ The discussion then waded into a mire of pointless precision and logic chopping. The person who spoke up against this way of proceeding was right. Just discussing the meaning of ‘to know’ in English means uncritically taking on board a load of ideas many of which may be completely wrong. This is a completely wrongheaded way to do epistemology, but the people involved in trying to justify the way people use ‘to know’ were too busy looking at the fine details to see this problem. As such they spend all their time working on a problem they could solve by spending two minutes with a dictionary instead of spending their time trying to solve interesting epistemological problems.

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What Is Liberalism About?

Rafe Champion writes:

[Mirowski] offers a list of eleven tenets of neoliberalism. Some of them are very strange. 1. “The starting point of neoliberalism is the admission, contrary to classical liberal doctrine, that their version of the good society will triumph only if the becomes reconciled to the fact that the conditions for its existence must be constructed and will not come about ‘naturally’ in the absence of concerted political effort and organization”.

This is supposed to hint at contradiction but laissez faire liberalism did not preclude state action in the form of “construction’, meaning piecemal experiments and instiutional reforms to control the use of force and fraud, to adminster police systems, courts and the laws of the land. It is like the no brainer that Hayek was opposed to planning, so he had to explain that planning is something that people do all the time, the objection is to holisistic or collectivist planning by the state.

Mirowski is differentiating between the wrong things. He considers “natural” vs “unnatural” construction. But what is natural, and anyway who cares? Laissez faire liberalism (hereafter just called liberalism) has never been about what is about “natural”.

What liberalism really cares about is force. It cares about voluntary vs involuntary. I think it’s sad how many people don’t see the difference between voluntary and involuntary as one worth paying attention to. But more to the point, if you want to discuss any kind of classical liberalism you have to understand this issue. Liberalism makes force, or voluntary vs involuntary, a central part of its worldview, so blindness to it leads to severe misunderstandings.

Here, Mirowski is offereing a “neoliberal” criticism of liberalism which is that it rules out “concerted political effort and organization” because that is unnatural. But liberalism has no objection to “concerted political effort and organization” in general, so this doesn’t make sense. What liberalism does object to is Government, but for a different reason: because the Government uses force.

The somewhat similar criticism of liberalism that would make more sense is: the government is not purely voluntary, therefore all government action is incompatible with liberalism.

That is true except it should read “ultimately incompatible”. In other words, consistent liberals should believe in anarcho capitalism as a long term goal. But, well, so what? I do. Others do. Some don’t, but that’s not a problem with liberal ideas themselves.

In the meantime, we should improve things, and there’s nothing inconsistent about taking steps which don’t immediately arrive at perfection. Those steps should include not only reducing the size, scope, and coerciveness of Government, but also using Government and other present day institutions to do good things. We should do good using the best tools we have so far even if we know those tools contain some flaws; that’s not inconsistent.

When Rafe says state action isn’t precluded, I’m not sure if he has in mind something similar to what I said, if he has an objection to anarcho capitalism, or something else.

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Philip Mirowski on Popper and the Mont Pelerin Society

The dustjacket of  Mirowski’s collection of essays The Effortless Economy of Science indicates that he questions a host of theories, including the pictures of science  put forth by Popper, Polanyi and Kuhn. So he is a polymath and a giant killer. How did he dispose of Popper (in a page)?   In his list of references there are two Popper books, Conjectures and Refutations (a collection of essays) and Unended Quest, Popper’s intellectual autobiography, written for the Schillp Library of Almost Dead Philosophers series. Apparently he did not need to read Popper’s most seminal works or the one book that he wrote specifically on the methods of the social sciences (The Poverty of  Historicism).  

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Sir Peter Medawar on scientific method

Deductivism in mathematical literature and inductivism in scientific papers are simply the postures we choose to be seen in when the curtain goes up and the public sees us. The theatrical illusion is shattered if we ask what goes on behind the scenes. In real life discovery and justification are always different processes. . . . Methodologist who have no personal experience of scientific research have been gravely handicapped by their failure to realize that nearly all scientific research leads nowhere — or if it does lead somewhere, then not in the direction it started off with. In retrospect, we tend to forget the errors, so that "The Scientific Method" appears very much more powerful than it really is, particularly when it is presented to the public in the terminology of breakthroughs, and to fellow scientists with the studied hypocrisy expected of a contribution to a learned journal. I reckon that for all the use it has been to science about four-fifths of my time has been wasted, and I believe this to be the common lot of people who are not merely playing follow-my-leader in research. . .science in its forward motion is not logically propelled. . . . The process by which we come to formulate a hypothesis is not illogic, but non-logical, i.e., outside logic. But once we have formed an opinion, we can expose it to criticism, usually by experimentation; this episode lies within and makes use of logic.

"Induction and Intuition in Scientific Thought," American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1969, cited in A History of Immunology by Arthur Silverstein, page xviii-xiv

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Sir John Eccles on falsification

Until 1944 I had succeeded moderately well in the conventional scientific manner with beliefs that may be categorized as follows: that hypotheses grow out of the careful and methodical collection of experimental data; that the excellence of a scientist is judged by the reliability of these developed hypotheses, which no doubt would need elaboration as more data accumulated, but which it was hoped would stand as firm and secure foundations for further conceptual development; that it is in the highest degree regrettable and a sign of failure if a scientist espoused an hypothesis that was falsified by new data, so that it had to be scrapped altogether. In the years  preceding 1944 I had been occupied in a controversy concerning the roles of specific chemical substances in transmission across the functional connections (synapses) between nerve cells or between nerve and muscle fibers. It was becoming apparent to me in the mid-1940’s that the accumulating experiment all evidence was telling heavily against my hypothesis that at synapses there was a quick initial electrical action and slow later chemical transmitter action.

At this opportune time I learnt from Popper that it was not scientifically disgraceful to have one’s hypothesis falsified. In fact, I was persuaded to formulate the electrical hypothesis of excitatory and inhibitory synaptic action as rigorously as possible so that they invited falsifications. They were in fact falsified some years later in one of the first results of the intracellular method of investigating synaptic action. Thanks to my tutelage by Popper I was able to accept joyful this "death" of the "brain child" that I had nurtured for almost two decades, so that I was able to contribute immediately, both theoretically and experimental, to the successful rival (Loewi-Dale) hypothesis of chemical synaptic transmission. My personal experience has shown that action in accord with Popper’s view of scientific method has two great practical advantages. First, the development and precise formulation of an hypotheses so that it encourages attempts at falsification greatly economizes the experimental effort, and gives it significant direction. The experiments are designed so as to subject the hypothesis to the most rigorous testing. Diverse experimental procedures are not being tried simply in the hope that something interesting will turn up; usually such random probing is a wasteful procedure which has the great disadvantages of cluttering up the literature with reports of meaningless investigations. Second, when one’s hypothesis has been falsified one should even rejoice, because in this denouement science has been well served. We advance in scientific understand by the experimental rejection of erroneous hypothesis, clearing the way for new conceptual developments.

In brief, I regard it as of prime importance that recovery from erroneous scientific beliefs is so easy and natural when one adopts the "Popperian" view of scientific method. It would be invidious to cite examples of eminent scientists who were unable to recover from scientific error, or were able to do so only after great travail.

From "The Neurophysiological Basis of Experience ", in Critical Approaches to Science & Philosophy edited by Mario Bunge

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Peter Munz on knowledge as representation

Since knowledge is always knowledge of regularities and has therefore to be couched in terms of universal laws, it follows that knowledge cannot be representational. Knowledge is neither a map nor a mirror nor a portrait. Once this is admitted, we can again see the historical element in knowledge. If knowledge is knowledge of general laws, then the growth of knowledge is not just an accumulation of detailed and particular observations, but a growth of the universality of the general laws. We speak of progress, when the particular facts explained by a general law can be explained by a new general law which explains not only the particular facts already explained, but also other particular facts which had not been explained by an old general law. Knowledge of regularities cannot be representational because a universal law does not represent anything we can observe. At best, we can observe only a limited number of instances. A general law asserts something about regularities and therefore cannot represent what we can observe. With this argument we can eliminate from consideration all those thorny problems which occupied Positivists in general and Mach in particular. Mach was deeply concerned to distinguish between presentationalism, of which he approved, and representationalism, of which he disapproved. The former was the idea that the world is presented directly to consciousness and that the appearances are the external world and that observation of particular instances is real knowledge. Statements of regularities, he said, are merely short hand devises to sum up myriads of direct observations. Representationalism, on the other hand, was the idea that the external world is not directly presented to consciousness and that appearances are something mental and that the external world is something one can reliably infer from these appearances. If one take this view, there is no reason, he said, why one should imagine that any inference of this kind is ‘reliable’. Since we cannot consider either presentationalism or representationalism as knowledge, the whole question as to which of these two views is the correct one is without interest"

From Knowledge of the Growth of Knowledge, page 26

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