This is a draft for some thoughts to put on the Austrians email list.
The uneasy relationship between Popper and von Mises has persisted with many of their followers. Most Popperians are social democrats and many Misesians detest Popper’s epistemology and methods (in addition to his social democratic tendencies).
There are striking exceptions to that pattern such as the late Bill Bartley and Gerard Radnitzky and contemporaries such as Jack Birner, Larry Boland, Bruce Caldwell and Pete Klein. However I see hardly any citations of Larry’s work, or Jack’s in the Austrian literature on philosophy and methods, which is where their work is outstanding IMHO.
What Popper offers the Austrians.
1. Fallible or conjectural apriorism, supporting Barry Smith who is very much at home in the Austrian literature. (That reminds me, someone should nominate Barry for the CR Scholar award). This has the potential to focus the energies of Austrians on economics rather than philosophy and also to mount a challenge to other economists to bring their methods into line with the real methods of the natural sciences instead of the distorted version put about by the positivists and logical empiricists.
2. Support for the Weber/Austrian approach – the action framework (Parsons), situational analysis (Popper), praxeology (von Mises) with methodological individualism, subjectivism etc.
Boettke et al have signalled that economics is finding its way back to the big picture approach of Adam Smith and the political economists and moral philosophers who paid some attention to institutions and cognate influences. How did economics lose its way? At least Popper pointed in the right direction (even though e thought that methematical economics was going to pay off!). The institutional focus is explicit in the concluding sections 31 and 32 of The Poverty of Historicism and it is unhelpful that philosophers of economics have written so much criticism of Popper’s “falsificationism”, that distorted version of Popperism, without coming to grips with the book where he specifically addressed the social sciences. He hardly published anything on that topic after 1945 but he did draw a comparison between institutions and traditions in one of the Conjectures essays. The suggestion of the institutional turn in Poverty are very compacted, so sections 19, 20 and 20 should be read, followed by 30 and 31. People working in the relevant fields should not need more than those hints to get the message. Lately Ian Jarvie has traced the social/institutional turn in Popper’s thought from the very first published works, and this calls for a complete re-reading of Popper, to take account of the various “turns” that he initiated.
3. The theory of metaphysical research programs (MRPs) and some of the metaphysical theories which underpin Austrian economics. That paper “Austrian Economics as a Popperian MRP” makes three points.
First, the theory of MRPs shows that the Austrian program cannot be dismissed as “unscientific” quite as easily as many critics suppose. The theory of MRPs legitimates the use of untestable principles to provide the framework for a research program. The basic principles of Austrian economics can be regarded as working assumptions, either methodological or metaphysical postulates, of the kind that occur in all sciences. These need to stand up to criticism but they do not have to be testable or falsifiable.
Second, the paper notes thata the method of situational analysis and the rationality principle which Popper advocated for the explanation of events in the social sciences is practically identical to the Austrian approach which is labelled “praxeololgy” (the logic of action). This point is made in the Convergence paper.
Third, Popper championed some particular metaphysical assumptions that provide a congenial framework for the Austrian approach. In other words, Popper and the Austrians are metaphysical fellow travellers. That can be demonstrated by spelling out the agreement between Popper’s program and the Aristotelian metaphysics which Barry Smith found in Menger’s economics.
4. Support for classical liberalism (limited government under the rule of law)
A general statement of liberal principles (a Mont Pelerin address)
On leadership, chapter 7 of The Open Society and its Enemies.
On justice, chapter 6 of The Open Society.
On Misesian piecemeal social engineering.
On essentialism and the organic state.