Gunter Wachterhauser on CR and the origin of life on earth

In this paper Gunther Wachterhauser tells a fascinating story of the evolution of ideas about the nature of living matter, and how living things evolved, with a highly speculative theory about the very beginning of life on earth.

That is the background to his explanation of Popperism as the alternative to inductivism – hence the title of the essay “The Uses of Karl Popper”. It is a chapter in a book edited by Anthony O’Hear, Karl Popper: Philosophy and Problems. CUP 1995.

And here is Wachterhauser on Light and Life, and the origin of Visual Perception.

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Scientism vs Liberalism

In his book, “The Counter-Revolution of Science”, Hayek argued against scientism – attempts by the social sciences to ape the methods of the natural sciences by ignoring the subjectivity of economic value. I will apply these ideas to criticise of some current ideas that the government should use force to make people happier. Continue reading

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Yvor Winters on line

Yvor Winters (1900-1968) combined the careers of poet, critic, teacher and scholar but he was a marginal figure, sometimes lumped with the New Critics, sometimes dismissed as a simple-minded moralist.  Biographical notes here

At the height of his powers he wrote prose of marvelous clarity and vigour.  Some of his best essays stand as works of literature in their own right, something that cannot be said of very many modern works of criticism or scholarship.

One of his most impressive efforts is the Foreword to his collection of essays In Defense of Reason. Athough it was not written with the deconstructionists in mind, it can be seen as a three-pronged response to them. First, there is his robust sense of the reality of the external world, as one might expect from a man well versed in the system of St Thomas Aquinas (and also a breeder of Airedales). He wrote in the polemic preface to In Defense of Reason ‘I am acquainted, for example, with the arguments which prove that the wall is not there, but if I try to step through the wall, I find that the wall is there notwithstanding the arguments’. This is reminiscent of Dr Johnson’s response to Bishop Berkeley’s arguments to prove the non-existence of matter, consisting of kicking a stone ‘I refute it thus’. Continue reading

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Philosophy of biology vs philosophy of physics

Bartley wrote another long paper (more than 10,000 words) to demonstrate how the dominant philosophy of physics is refuted by biology (and is defective as the philosophy of physics). The paper begins with an exchange between Popper and a leading physicist, with Popper drawing applause from the biologists present when he pointed out that ‘what you say is refuted biology’.

The central theme of the paper is the way physics took on board the philosophy of idealism – “to be is to be perceived”- and became hostage to the doctrines of “sensationalism” (nothing to do with the gutter press) and “presentationalism” as opposed to the realistic approach that Bartley labeled “representationalism”.

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Popper and Wittgenstein as schoolteachers

Some time ago in this essay on the three world theory and literary criticism I suggested that there was a degree of similarity in at least one of the problems confronted by Popper and Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein, like Popper and Piaget, was taught by Buhler and he refused to take on board the mechanistic cause-and-effect model of physics to account for human language and behaviour. Wittgenstein’s response is his doctrine of  forms of life and language games. This may be compared with Popper’s answer – the three world theory, critical rationalism and conjectural objective knowledge. These divergent lines of thought are generally considered to be incommensurable and none of the myriad of books and articles generated by the Wittgenstein industry even mentions Popper. But once their common problem is recognised then they can be compared in terms of the fertility of their different solutions.

Bill Bartley did some research on the careers of Popper and Wittgenstein and turned up a lot of interesting information which adds some support to that proposition. The important factor was the exposure that each receive to the ideas of the Wurzburg school of psychlogists, especially their theories of language. He wrote a very long (10,000 word) paper on Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian Schoolteachers. Because the paper is so long, I have done a short form which is less than half the size in case this is more helpful for busy readers who don’t need all the scholarly details. Even the short form is still very wordy, so be prepared to skim!

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de Jasay vs Popper on social engineering

Anthony de Jasay is one of my favorite commentators, he is a libertarian or very strong liberal and a regular columnist even in his old age.  A search reveals that he is Hungarian born and spent time in both Austria and Australia!

After two years in Austria, he emigrated to Australia in 1950 and took a part-time course in Economics at the University of Western Australia. Winning a Hackett Studentship, he went to Oxford in 1955 and was elected a research fellow of Nuffield College where he stayed till 1962, publishing papers in the Economic Journal, the Journal of Political Economy and other learned journals.

In 1991 he published a scathing critique of  Popper and piecemeal social engineering, this turned  up by accident when I was browsing in Questia, the on-line library.

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More CR resources on line

Summary of Bartley’s paper A Popperian Harvest
 
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Howson on Deutsch

In Chapter 7 of his book The Fabric of Reality, David Deutsch has a dialogue in which he discusses critical rationalism with a crypto-inductivist, a philosopher who thinks there is an induction shaped hole in his worldview although he agrees that “inductive inferences” don’t work. Deutsch points out (pp. 150-153) that theories like “general relativity holds except for Gerry” who will not fall toward the Earth when unsupported, which are often said to pose a problem for critical rationalism aren’t a problem because they can be ruled out as bad explanations since they add unexplained complications to theories that solve problems. As part of this argument, Deutsch points out that changing our language to replace fall with x-fall which means “fall when unsupported, unless you’re Gerry, in which case you can float” doesn’t change this. Somebody who thought in terms of x-falling would still wonder why he will die when he x-falls although Gerry won’t and Deutsch states that English has fall rather than x-fall because languages implicitly contain explanations and in this respect English contains good explanations about falling.

In his pro-induction book Hume’s Problem on pp. 98-99, Colin Howson writes:

Deutsch considers a rather special grue variant to gravitational theory, in which a single exception is made to the rule that all bodies fall when unsupported (1997 : 151), but his argument applies to the more general form we have been considering as well. The argument is that such ‘theories’ are not explanatory because they postulate unexplained exceptions to a rule. To the objection that they can be made syntactically universal by introducing appropriate predicates, like ‘grue’, Deutsch replies that these merely conceal the fact that unexplained anomalies are being postulated, a fact which ordinary English, which evolved to express faithfully what is genuinely problematic and what is not, makes clear (p.153). Thus there is, claims Deutsch, a relevant asymmetry: currently accepted theory is explanatory in a way that the grue variants to it are not. It is strange to find the authority of Popper of all people, a thinker vehemently opposed to ‘ordinary-language’ arguments, being enlisted in such an enterprise. But Deutsch is really doing no more than restate the Goodman criterion of projectability based on what is entrenched in common concepts, and the same objection applies that we brought against that: science introduces unconventional concepts, a fact that Deutsch, himself something of a scientific revolutionary, should be the first to appreciate.

Here, Howson is missing the point. The current theory of gravity is conjectured to be true and it is a good explanation. It states that gravitational attraction is due to curvature of the gravitational field and works out the consequences of this conjecture in detail. This theory doesn’t refer to a particular place and time. The reason for framing the theory this way is to make it easier to criticise. Also, if the theory is true then it applies everywhere and explains all gravitational phenomena, so it’s a better explanation. None of this has anything to do with justification. The point of Deutsch’s argument about English is that he is explaining a feature of English using the standard theory, not using that feature of English to prove the standard theory. The fact that Howson sees none of this serves as an interesting illustration of Popper’s point that misinterpretation is unavoidable no matter how clearly you write.

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Utopianism, Libertarianism and Other Political Theories

In Chapter 9 of Volume 1 of The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper argues against utopianism. I have heard many people say that libertarianism is utopian. For example, in this series of videos the speaker often states or implies that libertarians, including Hayek, are utopian. I think this is based on a misunderstanding of what Popper wrote. I shall use libertarianism as an example to help illustrate what Popper’s argument implies and what it doesn’t imply.

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New History of Philosophy: Witt rules!

Xmas bookshopping, found the fourth volume of Sir Anthony Kenny’s history of western philosophy dealing with modern times, starting with Bentham to Neitzsche, then Pierce to Strawson, then Freud to Derrida, Logic, Language, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Aesthetics, Politics, God.

Popper gets a sentence in the section on Logical Positivism (in the Logic chapter) before two or three pages on Wittgenstein. (Witt gets space in Metaphysics as well, in fact the index shows between 30 and 40 pages for Witt spread over several chapters).

The reference in Logic reads something like “The most enduring legacy of the logical positivists is probably Logik der Forschung by Karl Popper who was not actually a member of the Circle”. But no hint about the contents or the differences with the Circle.

Kenny is apparently a scholar of theology and Wittgenstein. You would never have guessed:)

In the Politics chapter there are a couple of good paras on The Open Society.

Nothing in the chapters on epistemology, mind or metaphysics.

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