More helpers of Popper

Some more research assistants who worked with Karl Popper have turned up. Given the passage of time there is some uncertainty about the periods of service, for example the logician Lejewski is a possibility from an early period. Other names in the frame are Tyrone Lai,  Bernard Burgoyne,  Harvey Fields and Ivan Slade. When I have some spare time I will contact all the ex-research officers who I can find to pin down their own dates and any others that they can specify.

This is not a high priority, more important is some correspondence with the journals which published Bartley’s papers to get permission to reprint his major articles in a collection.

 

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New e book in the Critical Rationalist Papers series

Making Science Pay.

The papers in this collection address various aspects of scientific productivity, both the production of knowledge and the delivery of economic returns from scientific research, especially research backed by government  funding.  It  is a miscellaneous collection of pieces written at different times for different purposes, some aiming to make some point about the scientific enterprise, others merely reviews of interesting books. The main theme is to challenge some widespread  views about science and scientists.

The first paper is an sketch of the linked systems in the universities, other research bodies and the farming community which enabled Australian farmers to make a success on very unpromising soils. It dates from the time when the university system was being radically re-shaped  by ignorant social engineers in the hope of greater administrative efficiency and better economic returns from teaching and research.  That was a cruel joke  and it would have been clearly perceived as such in the light of  experience in the US reported by Jacques Barzun in The American University (1968).

The second piece is an interview with the late Jim Vincent  provides some insight into the way the system worked when men in “lab coats and gumboots”  turned up to help  the farmers . He was a great contributor to applied research in microbiology and I had the good fortune to meet him in his retirement to find what he had to say about his career.

The theme of scientific achievement runs through the obituary for Sir John Eccles  and several  book reviews which follow.  Eccles was born in Melbourne, studied in England, and moved via Sydney to New Zealand where he became a close friend and collaborator with Karl Popper. Francis Crick was the epitome of the Popperian researcher. He achieved fame in partnership with James Watson of The Double Helix and later wrote a reflective memoire of his life in science. Lewis Wolpert achieved the status of a pundit in the philosophy of science and declared Popper the most over-rated philosopher in the 20th century.  He edited a  valuable collection of interviews with Nobel prizewinners, including  Crick and also the prominent biologist Stephen Jay Gould, who made his mark as a leading opponent of “Creation Science”.  Apparently Gould liked to think of himself as a ‘New York city street kid’ and his two unfulfilled  dreams were  to play centre field for the Yankees baseball team, and to sing Wotan at the Met (the leading opera house in New York).  The scientists displayed few characteristics in common apart from a burning  interest in their vocation and a certain amount of entrepreneurial flair in making the most of opportunities. Many of these arose from the disruption of career paths by the war. For example a bomb destroyed the laboratory where  Crick had been painfully making his way as an experimental physicist.  Fortunately he was elsewhere doing war work on mines at the time and, after the war, he tossed up between brain research and molecular biology for a change of direction.

Life Among the Scientists is a piece of work in the genre of the anthropology or sociology of science. A team of four  headed by Max Charlesworth spent five years  of  “fieldwork”  among the tribe of scientists in the Walter and Eliza Hall Institute of Medical Research in Melbourne. The idea was to test the Received View of scientific method and some would think that was the Popperian approach of conjecture and refutation but the authors appeared to go along with Wolpert’s  mean opinion of Popper and he did not get a mention from start to finish of the 450 page report.  Later, in another context, Charlesworth mentioned, apparently as a joke on the scientists, that Popper was the only philosopher who was taken seriously by people in the Institute. There is some good reporting in the book and it is recommended (with reservations).

The extended summary of  Kealey’s book  on the economics of scientific research could be regarded as the centrepiece of this collection because it touches so many of the issues touched by the other contributions. I found the book at the University of Sydney book fair, at the knockdown price of four dollars (this was well before the collapse of the book trade). It has been culled, clean enough to be unread, from the science library.

Kealey challenged what he called the conventional “Baconian”  view that state-funded basic research feeds into technological developments which drive progress in human welfare. Bacon is often regarded as the father of the modern “inductive” scientific method. Kealey proposed what he called the Adam Smith model where the state has no special role to play. Old technology, in a give and take relationship with basic research, generates new technology (and new science) and promotes wealth and welfare.

He backed his thesis with a tour de force of historical scholarship from antiquity to the European Union and sophisticated analysis of data in modern times when more or less reliable statistical information became available. Trade and commerce emerged as the friends of research and human welfare alike with the state relegated to a minor role, as Smith put it,

“Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.”

Kealey noted the tendency towards contempt for industry and trade (and manual work) among philosophers and the aristocracy from Plato and Aristotle to the present day. He charted the important commercial innovations that came from the small Italian states and the Netherlands, followed by the Agricultural Revolution in Britain, with credit to farmers like “Turnip” Townsend in partnership with the associations of amateur scientists at the time. Then came the Industrial Revolution which permitted the population of Britain to triple while real per capita income doubled in real terms across all classes.  He described the welfare/warfare state designed by Bismarck and he criticised the illusion that German science and industry prospered under state protection.

Wars became major drivers of Big Government and also Big (and wasteful) Science. He produced evidence to demonstrate (a) basic research contributes very little to progress in industry, compared with on-site modifications of existing plant and (b) industry will fund basic research anyway, subject to  three “laws of funding for civil R&D”. The third law, which he corroborated, states that public funds not only displace private funds for research, but displace more than the sum of public funding (hence a net reduction in research expenditure).

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Hamming and Mills on research and scholarship

Very interesting papers by Hamming and Mills.  The Hamming piece is a summary of key points from a longish lecture which is well worth a look if you are actually engaged in research (Google Hamming+your research). The Mills contribution is an appendix to his book The Sociological Imagination, it is also rather long but he makes many important points which I will summarize.

Hamming observed many outstanding thinkers at close range, notably Feinman and others in the Mannhattan Project to build the atomic bomb and Shannon (a great pioneer of information theory) when they shared a room at the Bell Telephone Laboratories.

His advice in a nutshell: Work on the right problem at the right time in the right way.

It is essential to work on the important problems in the field at the time, so the best scientists will have a list of those problems, they will constantly review the list to re-set priorities, and they will focus on a problem where there appears to be an opening or an “attack”, as he called it. For example a friend in Adelaide in the 1960s did his doctoral thesis to develop the technique of thin layer chromatography to explore the matabolism of drugs by white cells, he was not a great scientist but he and his supervisor cornered a niche in the field by quickly developing the technique to work on some important problems in immunology.

Keep good company, that is people who are themselves working on major problems and who are willing to share ideas about them.

On personal traits, he nominated high levels of activity and energy, emotional commitment, willingness to go “the extra mile”,  courage and the ability to tolerate ambiguity.

When the work is done, then there is a need for selling, something that many scientists find beneath them. The good scientist will become expert in three types of presentations, first the major paper (preferably in a high impact journal), second the short summary presentation and the “on your feet” contribution in the heat of discussion at conferences and seminars.

Moving on to C. Wright Mills “On Intellectual Craftsmanship“.  This is written for serious scholars and researchers who regard themselves as a part of a classic tradition, for whom “soial science is the practice of a craft”. The practice of this craft is an integral part of life; “scholarship is a choice of how to live as well as a choice of a career”.

This calls for serious organization and a certain amount of “life planning”, starting with a set of files which function like the  journal of the creative writer. In the file “there is joined personal experiences and professional activities, studies under way and studies planned”. The file has to be under constant review, storing personal experiences and drafts of material that will eventually find their way into project plans and publications.

As for plans, he deplored the usual practice of planning in the course writing grant applications. These are more like PR than serious planning, angling to get funds for topics that are deemed “politically correct” (not a term he used) or “trendy”.

A scientist in full flight should have so many plans, or ideas, that the problem is – which to work on at any given time?  “He should keep a special little file for his master agenda, which he writes and rewrites just for himself and perhaps for discussion with friends. From time to time he ought to review this very carefully and purposefully, and sometimes, too, when he is relaxed.”

Three interludes

In a flourishing intellectual community there will be interludes of discussion about future work.

“Three kinds of interludes – on problems, methods, theory – ought to come out of the work of  social scientists, and lead into it again; they should be shaped by the work in progress and to some extent guide that work”.

As work proceeds over the  years and decades the files will multiply into sets  and subsets reflecting work that is being completed and published, work in progress, work that is seriously planned and more nebulous and speculative ideas that may bear fruit if an “attack” turns up.

The files will contain masses of notes based on reading and Mills explained the various types of reading, and the various types of notes that are required at the different stages of a project, illustrated by his own series of books on the various strata of US sciety, possibly inspired by the French novelist Balzac who set to write stories about life at levels of society in France at his time.

As to the conditions of work, like Hamming he commented on the need to cultivate good friends and professional associates, people who will listen and talk, even including imaginary characters!

“I try to surround myself with all the relevant environment- socia and intellectual – that I think might lead me into thinking well along the lines of my work. That is one meaning of my remarks above on the fusion of personal and intellectual life”.

One of the tasks of research in sociology as Mill practiced it is to shuttle back and forth between the classic work in the field and the contemporary literature. Out of this dialectic comes the quest for information to test his ideas.  He was under no illusion about starting with facts and one of the chapters in The Sociological Imagination is a crushing critique of “Abstracted Empiricism”. Another chapter is an equally devastating criticism of “Grand Theory” that is not controlled by testing.

“There is no more virtue in empirical inquiry as such than in reading a book. The purpose of empirical inquiry is to settle disagreements and doubts about facts, and thus to make arguments more fruitful by basing all sides more substantively. Facts discipline reason; but reason is the advance guard in any field of learning“. (my emphasis).

Of course he was using reason in the broad sense to include imagination and the use of the mind in all sorts of ways.

Writing: themes and topics

Mills addressed the task of writing up the book (which he assumed to be the outcome of the project) in terms of themes and topics (a distinction which he picked up from a great editor, Lambert Davis).  A topic is a subject which might be treated in a chapter of the book. The order of chapters brings up the issue of themes.

“A theme is an idea, usually of some signal trend, some master conception, or a key distinction, like rationality and reason, for example. In working out the construction of a book, when you come to realise the two or three, or as the case may be, the six or seven themes, then you will know that you are on top of the job. ”

These themes will keep turning up in connection with the different topics, they may appear to be repetitious, they may at first be clotted and confused in the more badly written parts of the manuscript.

“What you must do is sort them out and state them in a general way as clearly and briefly as you can…cross classify them with the full range of the topics…At some point all the themes should appear together, in relation to one another…maybe at the beginning of the book, certainly near the end…It is easier to write about this than to do it, for it is usully not so mechanical a matter as it may appear…Sometimes you may find that a book does not really have any themes. It is just a string of topics, surrounded of course by methodological introductions to methodolgy, and theoretical introductions to theory. These are indeed quite indispensable to the writing of books by men without ideas. And so is lack of intelligibility”.

Communication

“To overcome the academic prose you have first to overcome the academic pose.  It is much less important to study grammar and Anglo-Saxon roots than to clarify your answers to these three questions: (1) How difficult and complex after all is my subject? (2) When I write, what status am I claiming for myself? (3) For whom am I trying to write?”

This is probably the time to re-read George Orwell’s essay Politics and the English Language.

People who are serious about research and writing could do worse than re-visit the Hamming and Mills papers  and Orwell’s essay every four or five years to check that we are on track and getting the small things right, as football coaches like to say.

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Bartley/Hayek paper published

Rob Leeson from WA has been working in the Popper, Bartley and Hayek archives for some years and he invited me to contribute to his latest collection of papers in the project.  Last  night he was in touch to say that the book has been published.  Jeremy Shearmur and Stephen Kresge contributed papers and I am not familiar with the other  authors (and I don’t have a list).

This is the paper, apart from some minor changes in press.

It is a bit on the long side: practically everything I read these days is too long, even my own articles:)

One of the key points is the idea that irrationalism, prejudices and fanaticism are promoted or at least sustained by “foundationalist” or “justificationist” thinking. And two of the major contributors to that mode of thought are academic philosophy and all the “true belief” religions.

PS Don’t forget the Popular Popper series. I hope that the guides are the kind of thing that Popperians can recommend to friends who don’t have the time or the degree of interest required to read Popper’s books in the original.

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Important CR site

Thanks to Bruce Caithness, a site we should know about, run by Antoni Diller, a longtime promoter of non-justificationism.

This should have been on the list of CR Resources years ago, how come nobody told me?

What a shame that the Popper Web was not updated on a regular basis to provide a focal point for people interested in new work by Popperians. It was recently updated when Ray published his own book, and my site has been added but the CR blog is not listed. Come on Ray, how about playing a team game?

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Guides and other e books

The Guide to The Logic of Scientific Discovery has been reloaded with some minor corrections, also the links from the table of contents now work.

Other books are  now available in addition to the five guides, including my MA thesis on the Duhem problem, the collection Reason and Imagination and a collection of papers on Barzun and others from the Revivalist series in the Rathouse.

 

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Beyond The Outsider

In “The Popular Popper, The Guide to The Open Society and Its Enemies” (2013) Rafe Champion mentions Bryan Magee’s attendance at Popper’s 1958 address, titled “Back to the Pre-Socratics”, to the Aristotelian Society in London. Magee relates this in Chapter 11 of his “Confessions of a Philosopher” (1997). Magee was thrilled by the argument of unending critical feedback presented by Popper (before the publication of the English version of “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”) and he simply could not believe the ensuing discussion period in which questions from the audience ignored the revolutionary content and rather focussed on whether the essences of pre-Socratic philosophers had been properly represented by Popper.

I have found poignant illustration of this blindness in “Beyond the Outsider” (1965) by Colin Wilson. Wilson has been an eclectic writer on matters of the intellect and spirit, sometimes hitting interesting targets, but prone to being somewhat amorphous and, one might say, logically undisciplined. His big selling “The Outsider” was published in 1956. He is outside the professional philosophy establishment but his loose style still provides a mirror to some of the faults contained in certain schools.

Before progressing let us visit a Popper chronology:

Logik der Forschung 1934/5
The Open Society and its Enemies 1945
The Poverty of Historicism 1957
The Logic of Scientific Discovery 1959
Conjectures and Refutations 1963
Objective Knowledge 1972

Even if Wilson had not read any other Popper books, there might be enough of Popper’s views on science and metaphysics in “The Open Society and its Enemies” to prick his curiosity on substantive matters beyond criticisms of Plato, Hegel, Marx and Whitehead for instance.

Wilson says in his own discussion of Hegel (page 65) “What seems to be generally acknowledged – Karl Popper is one of the violently dissenting voices – is that in spite of his atrocious style, Hegel has a great deal more to say than most other philosophers of the nineteenth century.” He references Popper’s “Open Society and its Enemies” in the footnote and says briefly his view of Hegel is a “brilliant but unfair attack”.

That is the end of Popper for Wilson.

We are led in the fifth of seven chapters “The Changing Vision of Science” to consider what Wilson calls the Whitehead-Husserl revolution and thence to Maurice Merlau-Ponty and his “most significant book” “The Primacy of Perception” (1945) and the common enemy, Cartesian dualism which somehow is identified with “the scientific method”. I am not quite sure what this straw man scientific method is nor can I understand how perception can be primary, but returning to Chapter 2, page 75, Wilson out does himself by espousing scientism and I am not sure what else in the one sentence: “Descartes was almost certainly right in believing that nature will finally be fully explainable in terms of logic and science; but he was mistaken in assuming that the laws of the mind are the laws of logic and science.”

It gets much worse when he addresses meaning and Whitehead, science is seen as an attempt to see the world in terms of immediacy, and to reduce meaning to immediacy. Later he continues after looking further at Wittgenstein and Husserl, language was adulterated with preconceptions and fallacies and he has tried to show that the failure of existentialism was the failure to eliminate the preconceptions and fallacies – particularly the Cartesian fallacy. The final chapter concludes that the way forward lies through the development of language.

Wilson, for whom I have held some respect for his subject matter over the years, has shown in this meandering conclusion to the Outsider series the great pity that Popper’s critical rationalism has been so neglected.

It is a pity that The Popular Popper series was not available in the sixties.

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How to Win a Debate

how to win a debate

“You’re just trying to win the debate!”

I’ve been reading Teachers Without Goals: Students Without Purposes by Henry J. Perkinson. I cannot recommend this book enough.

The book totally embraces Karl Popper’s ideas as far as learning, and moreover, also embraces the concept of evolutionary epistemology.

I wanted to share a short passage from the book. Continue reading

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Popular Popper series complete

With the publication of  the guide to Objective Knowledge  overnight the five volumes of the Popular Popper series are now published on Amazon, going head to head with Mills and Boone in the $3.99 price bracket.

The first,  The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1935 in German and 1959 in English, is not a good introductory book although it is the most important book on the philosophy of science in modern times and all educated people need to understand the main lines of Popper’s thought, especially the six “turns” that he promoted. I will do a post on the turns later.

Each book in the series has a set of appendices to sketch Popper’s career, the six “turns”, the misrepresentation of his ideas from the very beginning by the mainstream philosophers, the top ten standard errors that are perpetuated  today and some case studies.

The Poverty of Historicism was written while Popper was on vacation in the south sea islands during WWII. It is the shortest of his books and he thought it was his most worst writing, though I think it is clear enough.

The  Open Society and its Enemies grew out of some notes that he made for Section 10 in The Poverty.

The Open Society was his war effort, aiming to combine the best parts of social democracy and classical liberalism so that there would be less confusion and division among the friends of freedom. The result was a book that was scorned by conservatives and the left alike, so it is practically impossible to find on university reading lists and it is kept in print by a lay readership.

Conjectures and Refutations (1963) is a collection of 40 pieces that were mostly deliverd as speeches and presentations during the 1950s. It provides a comprehensive guide to the range of Popper’s thought, unlike The Poverty (1957) and The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959).

Objective  Knowledge  (1973) had the misfortune to appear a decade after the appearance of <i>The Structure of Scientific Revolutions</i> by T. S. Kuhn which swept the field in the 1960s. Popper’s stocks were falling under the influence of criticism from Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. Bartley, arguable his most brilliant and energetic supporter, was no longer on the team after a falling-out with Popper in 1965. In addition Popper retired in 1969 and this meant that he no longer had an institutional base in the London School of Economics.

Imre Lakatos became the new king and “kingmaker” in the LSE. The general perception of his program was that he was trying to save whatever could be retrived from the wreck of “Popperian falsificationism”, supposedly sunk by criticism from Kuhn, Feyerabend and himself. It is probably more realistic to say that the was attempting to effect a Hegelian synthesis of Popper’s theory of programs and Kuhn’s paradigm theory while admitting a whiff of induction to keep on side with the logical empiricists. This involved a great deal of “whatever it takes” academic politics. As a battle-hardened Stalinist operative Lakatos had the political part of the game well in hand as long as he lived but the enterprise did not thrive after his death in 1974 because it had  no intellectual legs to stand on. However he did succeed in killing the momentum of critical rationalism in the form that was taught by Popper and others who had a better understanding of Popper’s ideas.

And so it goes.

After the Popular Popper series there will be a Critical Rationalist Papers series of Amazon ebooks consisting of 30,000 word collections of papers from the Rathouse and other sources.

 

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The Popular Popper Guide to The Open Society is here!

The third of the Popular Popper series has hit the streets, or at least the Kindles and cognate apps.

Conjectures and Refutations is just about ready to load, then it takes a few hours or maybe a day to appear live.

Objective Knowlege will be close behind.

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