Category Archives: epistemology

I have read some philosophy of mind over the past couple of weeks and have come across some odd justificationist arguments. You know the ones I mean: ‘I can be certain that I think X’, or ‘When I am having … Continue reading →

When we corroborate a theory (i.e., it passes tests), the theory is better in some way. This is a dangerous statement because being better sounds like it’s more supported. The way it’s better is this: it is now harder to … Continue reading →

David Deutsch wrote: He chose ‘two years’ because it survived this criticism best of all the propositions he chose. What does this mean? How can a theory partially survive criticism?

Following up on my post about critical preferences, I have written a criticism of them and an alternative view. I posted it on my website. Please feel free to comment or reply here.

What problem is the idea of a “critical preference” intended to solve? (And how does it solve it?) I think the problem is this: We form theories to solve our problems, and we criticize them. Sometimes we decisively refute a … Continue reading →

Many people conflate explanation and justification. An explanation is a theory about why something happened or why we should do one thing rather than another. A justification is a story about why we are right, or probably right, to adopt … Continue reading →

Since knowledge is always knowledge of regularities and has therefore to be couched in terms of universal laws, it follows that knowledge cannot be representational. Knowledge is neither a map nor a mirror nor a portrait. Once this is admitted, … Continue reading →

The philosophy of late Wittgenstein consisted largely in the contention that the meaning of a sentence consists in its ‘use’. If ‘use’ equals ‘meaning’ then ‘meaning’ equals ‘use’. [footnote omitted] Since all knowledge is a linguistic phenomenon or something expressed … Continue reading →