Nicholas has been very active (actually hyperactive and prolific) for many years, now running into decades, spreading his unique views on the philosophy of science and the need to address practical problems more effectively. We met in Vienna at the Popper Centennial Conference in 2002. He has always encouraged my efforts and I have reciprocated by putting a small piece of his on line here
Do We Need an Academic Revolution?
Nicholas Maxwell
(Emeritus Reader in Philosophy of Science at University College London)
The crisis of our times is that we have science without wisdom. This is the crisis behind all the others. Population growth, the terrifyingly lethal character of modern war and terrorism, immense differences of wealth around the globe, annihilation of indigenous people, cultures and languages, impending depletion of natural resources, destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, rapid mass extinction of species, pollution of sea, earth and air, thinning of the ozone layer, the aids epidemic, and most serious of all the impending disasters of climate change: all these crises have been made possible by modern science and technology.
Indeed, in a perfectly reasonable sense of “cause”, they have been caused by modern science and technology. If by the cause of event E we mean that prior change which led to E occurring, then it is the advent of modern science and technology that has caused all these crises. It is not that people became greedier or more wicked in the 19th and 20th centuries; nor is it that the new economic system of capitalism is responsible, as some historians and economists would have us believe. The crucial factor is the creation and immense success of modern science and technology. This has led to modern medicine and hygiene, to population growth, to modern agriculture and industry, to world wide travel (which spreads diseases such as aids), and to the destructive might of the technology of modern war, conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear.
All this is to be expected. Successful science produces knowledge, which facilitates the development of technology, all of which enormously increases our power to act. It is to be expected that this power will often be used beneficially (as it has been used), to cure disease, feed people, and in general enhance the quality of human life. But it is also to be expected, in the absence of wisdom, that such an abrupt, massive increase in power will be used to cause harm, whether unintentionally, as in the case (initially at least) of environmental damage, or intentionally, as in war and terror.
Before the advent of modern science, lack of wisdom did not matter too much; we lacked the means to do too much damage to ourselves and the planet. But now, in possession of unprecedented powers bequeathed to us by science, lack of wisdom has become a menace. The crucial question becomes: How can we learn to become wiser?
The answer is staring us in the face. In order to learn how to become wiser we need traditions and institutions of learning rationally designed to help us learn wisdom. This at present we do not have. Academic inquiry as it exists at present, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how, is grossly and damagingly irrational when assessed from the standpoint of helping humanity acquire wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value for oneself and others, and thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how. (Like knowledge, wisdom can be thought of as something possessed, not just by individuals, but by institutions, societies and cultures.)
Two elementary, banal rules of rational problem-solving are: (1) articulate the problem to be solved, and (2) propose and critically assess possible solutions. A kind of academic inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity solve its problems of living so that that which is of value may be realized (thus enhancing wisdom) would put rules (1) and (2) into practice: it would give intellectual priority to (1) articulating our problems of living and (2) proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, possible actions, policies, philosophies of life. This goes on, at present, within academia, but only on the fringes: the primary intellectual activity is to solve problems of knowledge, not problems of living. To pursue knowledge more or less dissociated from the attempt to help humanity resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just and cooperative ways than at present is not only irrational; it is a recipe for disaster, as we have seen. It is this which has led to our distinctively modern global problems.
As I have argued at length elsewhere[1] we need to bring about a revolution in the academic enterprise so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom rather than just acquire knowledge. Social inquiry needs to change, so that it gives intellectual priority to problems of living over problems of knowledge about the social world. The relationship between social inquiry and natural science needs to change, the new kind of social inquiry becoming more fundamental intellectually than natural science. The natural sciences need to change so that three domains of discussion are recognized, namely evidence, theory, and aims, the latter involving problematic issues about what is unknown, and values. Education needs to change. The whole relationship between academia and the social world needs to change, so that academia does not just study the social world, but rather is in two-way debate with it, ideas, experiences and arguments flowing in both directions. Academia needs to become a kind of people’s civil service, doing openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments.
Academics today have a profound responsibility before humanity to put their house in order, intellectually and morally, and create a kind of inquiry rationally devoted to helping humanity learn how to resolve its conflicts and problems of living in more just, cooperative ways than at present.
[1] See my From Knowledge to Wisdom, 1984, Blackwell, 2nd ed., 2007, Pentire Press. See also How Universities Can Help Create a Wiser World: The Urgent Need for an Academic Revolution, 2014, Imprint Academic. Many of my publications are available at http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html. There is more about my work at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/from-knowledge-to-wisdom.
I am very disappointed with this post, I offered to put up a post from Nick as a reciprocal favour for promoting my ebooks on his list but I should have retained the right to reject it if it does not add value.
In the early days after 2002 when Nick was promoting his ideas about wisdom I anticipated that his grasp on Popper’s ideas and critical rationalism would eventually come through and enable him to promote a more helpful approach to science and social issues as well. This has not happened, he has persisted with a demand for a revolution in academia in the name of an almost mystical devotion to wisdom and I have to apologize to the group for wasting your time with this contribution.
Rafe,
I’m surprised but relieved at your comment.
Maxwell’s argument is rhetorical and spurious. Perhaps I’m being unfair, but it seems like ‘wisdom’ is just a weasel word for morals and policies that Maxwell supports. However, it’s much easier to argue vaguely for wisdom than it is to argue for particular moral or political positions, because who would be against wisdom? Reading this post, I was struck by the feeling that I was reading a political speech, replete with alarmism and equivocation.
Summary of my reading notes:
The article sees science as fundamentally flawed as according to the author, “science” is without wisdom. Thus there is a concern that without wisdom humanity will make poor choices. I strongly disagree with this way of putting things. I see the problem as one of not knowing the unintended consequences of our actions – and I see science when viewed institutionally as a big part of the solution. In this sense, the article needlessly hammers on science making it into a enemy – whereas, in fact, it is the very solution the author is looking for. I don’t like to argue over definitions, but I would suggest that in this problem context science is wisdom.
Reading notes:
1. The article starts out with two terms which are not well defined in the context and juxtaposes them, science and wisdom. To me this isn’t a propitious start because it suggests a discussion over two definitions. What is science? What is wisdom?
2. We are then given a litany of controversial topics, each presented without the controversy in a factual sort of manner that takes for granted the dire nature of each claim. Each claim is described vaguely as a crisis. I guess the meaning of crisis is that of an impending problem? But this introduces yet another term that is not clearly defined. What constitutes a crisis? A new claim is then made that “science” and “technology” are responsible. Here we now have a new undefined term, “technology.” So, we now have four questions hanging – what is science? What is wisdom? What constitutes a crisis? What is technology?
3. Now yet another term is introduced and discussed, the term “cause”. So something called “science and technology” are now to be regarded as the “cause” of these “crises”. We then enter into a discussion of what “cause” is intended to mean here.
4. Next we informed about what science is by looking at what science produces, some things good and some things bad. But we still don’t really have here an idea of what science is – or how it relates to technology. These are just floating definitions.
5. Finally we come to a claim that is perhaps clearer than that which precedes it. This claim is as follows, “Successful science produces knowledge, which facilitates the development of technology, all of which enormously increases our power to act.” Okay. There’s still a lot in play with these terms – such that I could easily agree or disagree with this statement, but giving the author the benefit of a doubt, I’ll agree for now.
6. In the third paragraph a claim is made that is reminiscent of the claim made in the Spider-man comic book, “with great power there must also come – great responsibility.” I don’t know how far back this claim goes, but one can find in the Christian bible the following phrase, Luke 12:48, “from the one who has been entrusted with much, much more will be asked”. I basically accept this claim.
7. Now again we come back to the juxtaposition of science (along with technology) against wisdom. Science and technology are presented as going hand in hand against wisdom. Of course, this juxtaposition is not possible if one embraces a philosophy along the lines of the one espoused by Karl Popper. Here, methodology defines science, so ethics comes first. In other words, wisdom facilitates science. Technology benefits from science, but not as we would expect. Science by acting in a critical capacity against invention, helps weed out bad designs, therefore leaving us with better designs. So technology is not in any manner built up on science.
So backing up here a minute, there are two points being lost in this essay:
a. To the extent science is an ethical enterprise, wisdom precedes the emergence of science.
b. Technology is not dependent of science, but benefits from it’s critical relationship with the knowledge science leaves us with.
8. There’s a bit of the scare mongering in the article – science could be dangerous unless we are wise! But this is a bit misconceived, I think. I agree some of the problems highlighted in the essay are genuine problems, but trying to *force* them into the author’s framework does not facilitate clarity but instead confusion.
9. “Before the advent of modern science, lack of wisdom did not matter too much; we lacked the means to do too much damage to ourselves and the planet.” Well, the problem will always exist that we can’t ever know the full consequences of our actions. How should we deal with this problem? Ironically, the answer *is* in part by science. So the solution to the problem is science – yet here the problem is seen as science. Note this is partially a disagreement over definitions, I suppose, but it shows the importance of Popper’s viewpoint that science rests on methodology – in other words, ethics.
10. “The answer is staring us in the face. In order to learn how to become wiser we need traditions and institutions of learning rationally designed to help us learn wisdom.” In this context, what is considered rational?
11. “Academic inquiry as it exists at present, devoted primarily to the pursuit of knowledge and technological know-how.” This is an interesting point. Take a case in point, the industrial development of Japan in the Meiji era. Meiji era policy makers systematically worked to have their country adopt modern technologies – and learn as fast as possible what was then considered to be the body of knowledge that was considered to be the fruits of science. However, as the story is told, they did not at all so readily adopt western cultural customs. The question then exists, does science flourish in Japan today? This is a controversial topic, but some would say no. This suggests again, that for science to yield fruits, we need to look at methodology. The methodology we want to suggest would be something similar to that suggested by Karl Popper. An excellent first look at this would be I. E. Jarvie’s paper – posted on-line by The Japan Popper Society! 🙂
http://fs1.law.keio.ac.jp/~popper/v7n1jarvie.html
12. So, what the author here takes to be the *problem*, science, could in fact be the solution. Again, I recognize there is a difference of definition here – I see science in an institutional manner. I see those institutions as the best way to deal with the unknown and unintended consequences of our actions.
13. “wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value for oneself and others, and thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how.” I just find this sentence to be so loose that I don’t really want to wrangle with it. Hopefully we can agree that we need ethical rules – and that the problem is the unintended consequences of our actions. I suggest, F. A. Hayek’s _Law, Legislation and Liberty_ here, especially the first volume.
14. “Two elementary, banal rules of rational problem-solving are: (1) articulate the problem to be solved, and (2) propose and critically assess possible solutions.” I’m not sure what point there is to calling this banal – I agree with this approach.
15. “the primary intellectual activity is to solve problems of knowledge, not problems of living.” Again we’re getting this juxtaposition between two terms that is not really necessary.
16. “As I have argued at length elsewhere[1] we need to bring about a revolution in the academic enterprise so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom rather than just acquire knowledge.” I think a better look at the problem is given by W. W. Bartley, III in his excellent, _Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth: On Universities and the Wealth of Nations_. Here Bartley sees the problem as in part economic – though he also fully embraces the methodology suggested by Popper as far as science is concerned.
17. “The natural sciences need to change so that three domains of discussion are recognized, namely evidence, theory, and aims, the latter involving problematic issues about what is unknown, and values.” I’m not sure what’s intended by “evidence, theory, and aims.” What all of us need to do is to promote the values of science – specifically as elucidated by Popper and some of his followers. Science is an ethical enterprise. In that sense, it rests on wisdom and need not be juxtaposed against it.
The article sees science as fundamentally flawed as according to the author, “science” is without wisdom.
Maybe I am misunderstanding your point he clearly states a situational analysis, of rather than a truth of, science.
I took him to mean that science, as it is used and practiced, does not have much wisdom. not that science is without wisdom fullstop.
To say that if we had a scientific establishment based on Popper’s philosophy of science then science would be an ethical enterprise, is therefore to criticse the state of science as it is, and not maxwell’s analysis of current scientific practice.
I suggest my critics have a look at the following:-
1. A Critique of Popper’s Views on Scientific Method, Philosophy of Science 39, 1972, pp. 131-52.
2. Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism, Philosophia 32, nos. 1-4, 2005, pp. 181-239.
3. From Knowledge to Wisdom: The Need for an Academic Revolution, London Review of Education, vol. 5, no. 2, 2007, pp. 97-115.
4. Practical Certainty and Cosmological Conjectures, in Is there Certain Knowledge?, ed., Michael Rahnfeld, Leipziger Universitätsverlag, Leibzig, 2006, pp. 44-59.
5. Has Science Established that the Cosmos is Physically Comprehensible?, in Recent Advances in Cosmology, Travena, A and Soen,B. (eds), 2013, Nova Publishers Inc, New York.
All available online at http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/view/people/ANMAX22.date.html.
My argument is however only spelled out in detail in my book “From Knowledge to Wisdom” (Blackwell, 1984; Pentire Press, 2007, 2nd revised and extended edition.
As I have always made clear, when space has permitted, my argument, spelled out in detail in the book and summarized in item 3, has nothing to do with wisdom at all. There is an argument that has to do, initially, with the aims of science. As I have shown, the view that the basic intellectual aim of science is truth without anything being presupposed about the truth is untenable. Science actually seeks truth presupposed to be explanatory. There is a substantial, highly problematic, metaphysical thesis built into the actual aim of science. This needs to be made explicit within science, so that it can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved. The view I put forward, aim-oriented empiricism, is designed to help us improve the highly problematic aims of science as we proceed. And there are value and political assumptions inherent in the aims of science as well – almost more problematic, and almost more in need of sustained critical scrutiny.
“Wisdom” is nowhere in sight. What I do is to argue that implicit, influential, highly problematic assumptions need to be made explicit so that they can be criticized and, we may hope, improved – a highly Popperian kind of argument.
Perhaps followers of Popper might pay a little more attention to my highly Popperian criticisms of Popper.
Nicholas Maxwell