The Guide to The Logic of Scientific Discovery has been reloaded with some minor corrections, also the links from the table of contents now work.
Other books are now available in addition to the five guides, including my MA thesis on the Duhem problem, the collection Reason and Imagination and a collection of papers on Barzun and others from the Revivalist series in the Rathouse.
I posted a review on Amazon:
“Reason and Imagination” is an informal collection of essays that Rafe Champion has written with respect to Karl Popper’s critical rationalism. The title could easily have been titled “Imagination and Reason” as a variant of Popper’s conjecture and refutation. The exploratory process in Popper’s view does not result in knowledge that can be justified as once and for all true but rather as preferences between critical alternatives. Imagination is vital as is criticism of the products of imagination.
Rafe Champion, a Tasmanian by birth, wrote, unsolicited, to Karl Popper in 1970 “You will probably not be surprised to hear that most of the important philosophical problems arise within cricket. I also have a hypothesis that historicism could not have been born in a cricket playing country”. The letter seemed to have worked as Rafe developed a relationship with Karl and many of his associates and has not relented in trying to keep critical rationalism alive in the public and academic forum.
This collection of Rafe’s essays may whet readers’ appetites to explore Rafe’s Popular Popper Reading Guides, also available in Kindle, and even some of Popper’s original works.
I actually concluded the Amazon review: We cannot learn anything by unprejudiced, uninformed staring at the world. We have to have a theory in our mind that tells us where to look, not unlike playing a ball sport such as cricket.
On the topic of cricket, the Australians were in England in 1972 while I was there, and Greg Chappell told a newspaper reporter that when he went to practice in the nets his aim was to eliminate errors in his technique.
I should have told Popper, but was put off by the fact that he never asked for an explanation of my claim that many the fundamental problems of philosophy emerge from a close study of cricket.