The Source of Justificationism?

Yesterday I discovered an interesting paper. It is “Why do Humans Reason: Arguments for an Argumentative Theory” by Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber. Here is the abstract:

Reasoning is generally seen as a mean to improve knowledge and make better decisions. Much evidence, however, shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests rethinking the function of reasoning. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given human exceptional dependence on communication and vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology or reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing but also when they are reasoning proactively with the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow the persistence of erroneous beliefs. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all of these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and favor conclusions in support of which arguments can be found.

That could almost have been written by a critical rationalist. Here are some excerpts from the conclusion:

Reasoning can lead to poor outcomes not because humans are bad at it but because they systematically strive for arguments to justify their beliefs or their actions. This explains the confirmation bias, motivated reasoning, and reason-based choice. These fundamental biases and flaws of human reasoning are well known. What the argumentative theory does is put them in a different perspective. Human reasoning is not a profoundly flawed general mechanism, it is a remarkably efficient specialized device (Mercier, submitted). It is not specialized for a specific domain of knowledge, but for a certain type of social and cognitive interaction. The task of finding persuasive reasons and accurately assessing others’ arguments, in which reasoning excels, is no small matter.

The following two excerpts bring to mind Popper’s “social turn,” and his comment that a little dogmatism may be a good thing for the institutions of science, since every idea should get a thorough and motivated defence.

At this point, one might be tempted to point out that, after all, reasoning is responsible for some of the greatest achievements of human thought in the epistemic and the moral domain. This is undeniable, but the achievements involved are all collective and result from interactions over many generations. The whole scientific enterprise has always been structured around groups, from the Lincean Academy down to the Large Hadron Collider. In the moral domain, moral achievements such as the abolition of slavery are the outcome of intense public arguments. We have pointed out that, in group settings, reasoning biases can become a positive force, contributing to a kind of division of cognitive labour.

Epistemic success may depend to a significant extent on what philosophers have dubbed ‘epistemic luck’ (Pritchard, 2005 ), that is, chance factors that happen to put one on the right track. When one happens to be on the right track and ‘more right’ than one can initially guess, some of the distorting effects of motivated reasoning and polarization may turn into blessings. For instance, motivated reasoning may have pushed Darwin to focus obsessively on the idea of natural selection and explore all possible supporting arguments and consequences.

I am sure almost all critical rationalists have suspected at some time or other that justificationism is deeply ingrained in human nature. It seems as though much of philosophy is pursued in the manner that Mercier and Sperber describe, and turned up a few notches.

Anyway, the paper is quite provocative. The authors are themselves justificationists, but they are tapping into some very critical rationalist insights.