Situational logic in The Poverty of Historicism

My summary of The Poverty of Historicism does not adequately cover the last few sections, probably because there was a rush to finish and get on with some other tasks. The sections are:

31 Situational logic in history and 32 The institutional theory of progress

Alan Donagan, in the Shilpp volume on Popper, wrote that “the results of Popper’s examination of historicism were not all nevative. His exploration…led directly to two positive conclusions of great  importance, the theory of situational logic in history, and the institutional theory of progress.”Section 31 is a preliminary sketch of the situational logic or situational analysis which became one of Popper’signature ideas. The point is to get clear about the different organising principles for theoretical and historical studies. In theoretical studies (conducted by the generalizing sciences), work is organised around theories, their  comparison and testing. The same logic applies when theories are used in for practical applications in technology, though this is not usually regarded as  a part of the critical scientific enterprise. Of course theories are not usually applied until they have been tested well enough to be considered safe (with margins for error included in the designs).  

The situation with historical studies is different and here the organising principle is the point of view, the story line for the narrative. There are any number of narratives and the test of truth can be applied but still one does not usually try to choose between different narratives in the way that one would try to choose between rival theories.

Popper noted that the historicists got into trouble here by elevating points of view to the status of universal explanatory theories. A classic case is the history of the class struggle. This can be illuminating but it is a point of view and it is an “essentialist” error to parade that angle as a universal theory (history is essentially the history of the class struggle).  

Such selective approaches fulfil functions in the study of history which are in some ways analogous to those of theories in science. It is therefore understandable that they have often been taken for theories. And indeed, those rare ideas inherent in these approaches which can be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses, whether singular or universal, may well be treated as scientific hypotheses. But as a rule, these historical ‘approaches’ or ‘points of view’ cannot be tested. They cannot be refuted, and apparent confirmations are therefore of no value, even if they are as numerous as the stars in the sky. We shall call such a selective point of view or focus of historical interest, if it cannot be formulated as a testable hypothesis, a historical interpretation.

Historicism mistakes these interpretations for theories. This is one of its cardinal errors. It is possible, for example, to interpret ‘history’ as the history of class struggle, or of the struggle of races for supremacy, or as the history of religious ideas, or as the history of the struggle between the ‘open’ and the ‘closed’ society, or as the history of scientific and industrial progress. All these are more or less interesting points of view, and as such perfectly unobjectionable. But historicists do not present them as such; they do not see that there is necessarily a plurality of interpretations which are fundamentally on the same level of both, suggestiveness and arbitrariness (even though some of them may be distinguished by their fertiliy–a point of some importance). Instead, they present them as doctrines or theories, asserting that ‘all history is the history of class struggle’, etc. And if they actually find that their point of view is fertile, and that many facts can be ordered and interpreted in its light, then they mistake this for a confirmation, or even for a proof, of their doctrine.

On the other hand, the classical historians who rightly oppose this procedure are liable to fall into a different error. Aiming at objectivity, they feel bound to avoid any selective point of view; but since this is impossible, they usually adopt points of view without being aware of them. This must defeat their efforts to be objective, for one cannot possibly be critical of one’s own approach, and conscious of its limitations, without being aware of it.

The way out of this dilemma, of course, is to be clear about the necessity of adopting a point of view; to state this point of view plainly, and always to remain conscious that it is one among many, and that even if it should amount to a theory, it may not be testable.

In this section there is an extremely compacted statement about the need for instutional studies. 

Beyond this logic of situations, or perhaps as a part of it, we need something like an analysis of social movements. We need studies, based on methodological individualism, of the social institutions through which ideas may spread and captivate individuals, of the way in which new traditions may be created, and of the way in which traditions work and break down. In other words, our individualistic and institutionalist models of such collective entities as nations, or governments, or markets, will have to be supplemented by models of political situations as well as of social movements such as scientific and industrial progress. (A sketch of such an analysis of progress will be found in the next section.)

This can be seen as a call for the kind of work where Douglas North won a Nobel Prize.  In his acceptance speech he stated “Institutions form the incentive structure of a society and the political and economic institutions, in consequence, are the underlying determinant of economic performance.”

THE INSTITUTIONAL THEORY

S 32 provides an example of the institutional approach as an alternatile to the psychlogicsm of Comte and Mill. They believed that progress in science and industry is an absolute trend, based on the progressive tendency of the human mind. Popper noted that ther are other tendencies of the huma mind like forgetfullness, indolence and dogmatism.

If we wish to replace this surprisingly naïve theory by a more tenable one, we have to make two main alterations. First, we have to attempt to find conditions of progress, and to this end we must try to imagine, for example, conditions under which progress would be arrested. This immediately leads to the realization that a psychological propensity alone cannot be sufficient to explain progress, since conditions may be found on which it may depend. Thus we must, next, replace the theory of psychological propensities by something better; I suggest, by an institutional (and technological) analysis of the conditions of progress.

He speculated about ways to arrest scientific and industrial progress, for example by closing down (or subjecting to political control) laboratories for research, scientific periodicals, congresses and conferences, universities and printing presses. This is a part of his take on the social nature of science, spelled out in chapter 23 of The Open Society (an early sign of the “social turn” described by Ian Jarvie).

Science, and more especially scientific progress, are the results not of isolated efforts but of the free competition of thought. For science needs ever more competition between hypotheses and ever more rigorous tests. And the competing hypotheses need personal representation, as it were: they need advocates, they need a jury, and even a public. This personal representation must be institutionally organized if we wish to ensure that it works. And these institutions have to be paid for, and protected by law. Ultimately, progress depends very largely on political factors; on political institutions that safeguard the freedom of thought: on democracy.