The Popperian legacy in economics was the theme of a conference in Amsterdam in 1985. The editor of the proceedings, de Marchi, noted that most of the time was spent (without a conclusion) on the need for a better demarcation criterion. Jack Birner described it as a Popper-bashing exercise. Surprisingly, the best equipped Popperian for the task was not invited to participate. That was Larry Boland, properly trained in mathematical economics and a student of Joe Agassi. Boland wrote a review of the book which clarifies a great deal of the confusion.
The tone of the gathering was set in the paper by Dan Hausman when he claimed that he had demolished the twin towers of Popper’s epistemology, namely the demarcation criterion (plus various rules for testing theories) and Poppers response to the problem of induction. In fact the paper is an elaborate misreading of Popper’s ideas, recycling a number of unhelpful criticisms which are standard in philosophical circles. He noted that some people, notably Larry Boland, dissent from the standard reading of Popper that is subjected to criticism and he wrote “it would be a useful exercise, not undertaken here or elsewhere in this volume, to trace the course of this divergence between the intended and the received message”. Some of it can be traced in his own writing, as in this post.
In my view philosophers have simply not taken the measure of the change that Popper introduced when he provided an alternative to the traditional epistemological preocuppation with the justification of subjective beliefs. In the empiricist tradition that objctive is sought by way of a solution to the problem of induction in order to deliver a meaure of the degree of positive support or credibility of a theory.
In contrast, Popper launched a conjectural turn with a theory of objective (public and inter-subjective) knowledge which is capable of growing by way of better theories which nevertheless never achieve positive support on inductive or “justificationist” lines. In brief, Popper replaced the problem of justified belief with the problem of critical preference for the best theory available at the time. What is best can be related to the problem at hand. For practical purposes the best theory may be one that is known to be false but is easy to use and near enough to the truth, like using Newtonian formulas to calculate the stopping distances for your car.
Nothing useful was said at the conference about the work that Popper actually did in the social sciences, on methods in The Poverty of Historicism, his critique of some aspects of Marxist economics in The Open Society and its Enemies, his proposals for Situational Analyis and the Rationality Principle as a general model of explanation in the human sciences.
So here is an agenda for a conference that would really tell us something about Popper’s legacy in economics and the social sciences.
1. A paper to provide a straight feed on Popper’s epistemology and methodology, with a connection to economics. Larry Boland could handle this (see his review, linked above). See his website as well!.
2. A paper from Malachi Hacohen on the development of Popper’s ideas as he made the move from the philosophy of physics to write The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society. This would mention the Popper’s contact with Wald, von Neumann and Morgenthau in Karl Menger’s symposium and the influence of the young economist Colin Simkin in NZ.
3. The promising convergence of Parsons, Mises and Popper in the 1930s, a potential meeting of minds that never happened.
4. Jack Birner on some parallels between the approach of Menger and Popper.
5. A case study, Stanley Wong’s use of the Popperian bag of tricks to demolish Samuelson’s theory of demand.
6. A critque of Popper’s critique of Marxist economics. Hans Hermann-Hoppe could hande this. Don’t hold back Hans, no more mister nice guy, tell us what you really think.
7. A recapitulation of the arguments that Popper used to shaft central economic planning, Robinson Crusoe science and the strong program in the sociology of science in chapter 23 of The Open Society.
8. A paper by Bruce Caldwell on methodological pluralism, Bruce would explain how Popper has provided a theory of pluralistic criticism: that is five forms of criticism, but unforunately Popper’s marketing division did not hit on the idea of bundling his ideas in that way.
9. A description of Austrian economics as a Popperian metaphysical research program.
10. Barry Smith’s account of Austrian economics as an Aristotelian program, which is practically identical to the Popperian program.
11. Something about the abortive confrontation with Adorno et al in the so-called Positivism Debate.
12. A historical/social account of the way that a sawn-off version of Popperism called “falsificationism” became the received verison of his thinking, especially through the influence of Lakatos, Latsis and Blaug.
